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ARTICLE 
RETIREMENT REVOLUTION: UNMITIGATED 
RISKS IN THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
SOCIETY 
Anne Tucker∗ 
ABSTRACT 
A revolution in the retirement landscape over the last 
several decades shifted the predominant savings vehicle from 
traditional pensions (defined benefit plans) to self-directed 
accounts in defined contribution plans like the 401(k) and has 
drastically changed how people invest in the stock market and 
why. The prevalence of these self-directed accounts has created 
our defined contribution society and a new class of investors—the 
citizen shareholders—who enter the private securities market 
through self-directed retirement plans, invest for long-term 
savings goals, and are predominately indirect shareholders. With 
90 million Americans invested in mutual funds, and nearly 75 
million who do so through defined contribution plans, citizen 
shareholders are the fastest growing group of investors. Yet, 
citizen shareholders have the least protections despite 
conventional wisdom that corporate law and ERISA protections 
safeguard both these investors and their investments. As 
explained in an earlier paper, citizen shareholders do not fit 
neatly within the traditional corporate law framework because 
their investment within a defined contribution plan restricts 
choice and their indirect ownership status dilutes their 
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information and voting rights, as well as exacerbates their 
rational apathy as diffuse and disempowered “owners.” 
The retirement revolution from pensions to 401(k) has 
changed not only how individuals prepare for retirement but also 
who bears certain risks that affect the retirement nest egg. 
Under self-directed defined contribution plans, but not defined 
benefit plans, citizen shareholders bear the risks of poor market 
performance, longevity, and information asymmetries, as well as 
plan administrative costs and life-long responsibility of asset 
management. Research indicates that citizen shareholders, 
particularly those who are women, minorities, and those with 
lower education levels, often lack the financial literacy necessary 
to maximize both individual and society-wide retirement savings. 
These changes, and their consequences, are firmly established in 
our defined contribution society and are a result of the 
retirement revolution. Yet, these changes are not widely 
understood by individuals saving for retirement, nor have they 
been incorporated into how we think and talk about shareholders 
in and outside of the academy. In this Article, I build on previous 
work, which articulated the citizen shareholder status and its 
incompatibility with traditional corporate law, by identifying and 
explaining the second prong—that citizen shareholders have 
substantially weakened protections under ERISA and bear 
substantially increased risks and responsibility in our defined 
contribution society. I suggest that these risks could be better 
managed and mitigated through a series of structural and 
individually focused reforms.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For young workers, saving for retirement is an unpleasant 
eventuality that promises stress and poses future risks far too 
great to imagine today. Little changes as workers age—
retirement still feels far off and many intervening events have 
yet to occur. With thirty years to accumulate a nest egg and the 
hope for future increased savings or a booming stock market, 
workers tend to save too little, generally pay inadequate 
attention to retirement planning, and raid accumulated savings 
even though these actions have tremendous potential for 
personal detriment. The average 401(k) balance is $80,9001 while 
the average for workers reaching retirement age is $200,000.2 
                                            
 1. Ashlea Ebeling, Fidelity: 401(k) Balances Reach Record Highs, FORBES (May 23, 
2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2013/05/23/fidelity-401k-
balances-reach-record-highs/. 
 2. INV. CO. INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 121 (53d ed. 2013), 
available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf (reflecting the average 
savings of workers over age sixty who have been with their current employer for thirty 
years or more). The reader should note that the number is reported as an average, which 
can be skewed by high earners with substantial accumulated savings, and it is not the 
mode, which reflects the most common occurring account balance. 
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While not an insignificant amount of savings, it is insufficient to 
meet most modest estimates of retirement savings needs when 
variables such as life expectancy, market volatility, and long-
term care costs are taken into account.3 
The average American employee saving for retirement does 
so through investments pooled in an individual account found in 
self-directed defined contribution plans,4 like the 401(k)—the 
subject of this Article. The growing ubiquity of these self-directed 
retirement accounts gave birth to the retirement revolution and 
the resulting defined contribution society,5 where the majority of 
individual retirement savings are invested in private securities 
markets. 
The retirement revolution promoted self-directed defined 
contribution plans, provided workers flexibility in the type of risk 
exposure they choose, and facilitated greater job mobility.6 For 
most workers, long gone are the days of weighing alternative job 
                                            
 3. Dan Kadlec, Sizing Up the Big Question: How Much Money Do You Need to 
Retire?, TIME (Feb. 11, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/02/11/sizing-up-the-big-
question-how-much-money-do-you-need-to-retire/ (stating that due to factors such as life 
expectancy, medical costs, and inflation, “by age 65 an average full time career worker 
needs to have banked 11 times annual pay. . . . [meaning] a household earning $75,000 a 
year would need to have saved $825,000”). 
 4. Alicia H. Munnell, Employer-Sponsored Plans: The Shift from Defined Benefit to 
Defined Contribution, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME 359, 
365–66 (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., 2006). Common defined contribution plans include 
Money Purchase plans, Target Benefit plans, Profit Sharing plans, 401(k) plans, Stock 
Bonus plans and Employee Stock Ownership plans. See generally Phyllis C. Borzi, ERISA: 
A Basic Approach to Key Terms and Concepts Under Title I of ERISA, in 1 ERISA BASICS, 
at A-9, A-16 (ABA ed., 2011). The distinguishing feature of self-directed defined 
contribution plans, which is the subject of this paper, is that employers provide separate 
benefit accounts that the plan maintains for each participant. BARRY KOZAK, EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT PLANS 84–85 (2010). Participants direct the investment allocation in these 
accounts and employers may provide a matching or minimum level of contribution to the 
account as well. See, e.g., 403(b) Plan Basics, IRS (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p571/ch01.html; IRC 457(b) Deferred Compensation Plans, 
IRS (Feb. 2013), http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/IRC-457(b)-Deferred-
Compensation-Plans (describing how contributions are made to the plan). At retirement, 
a participant’s retirement benefits are limited to the amount in the account. KOZAK, 
supra, at 86. 403(b) plans, available for employees of public schools, employees of certain 
tax-exempt organizations, and certain ministers, and 457 plans, available for certain state 
and local governments and nongovernmental entities tax exempt under IRC 501, are also 
self-directed accounts. 403(b) Plan Basics, supra; IRC 457(b) Deferred Compensation 
Plans, supra. 
 5. “In a defined contribution society, the policies more likely to be adopted are 
those that channel government subsidies through individual accounts controlled by the 
taxpayer herself.” Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE 
L.J. 451, 453 (2004). 
 6. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDÉN, COMING UP SHORT: THE 
CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 16, 19 (2004) (discussing the shift of responsibility from 
employers to employees and that, once vested, an employee will not forfeit benefits when 
changing employers). 
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opportunities against lost retirement income under traditional 
defined benefit plans, referred to as pensions.7 In defined benefit 
plans, employers sponsored, funded, managed, and paid 
guaranteed benefits upon retirement, often for the life of the 
employee.8 In self-directed defined contribution plans, employers 
provide investment portals for employees to contribute money, 
often matched by employers, into individual accounts that are 
invested by the employee in employer-chosen investment 
instruments.9 I discuss the distinctions between the two regimes, 
and the consequences of each, in detail in the following pages. It 
may be useful at the outset to think of defined benefit regulations 
as focused on outputs—employers guaranteeing retirement 
payments—whereas regulations governing self-directed defined 
contribution plans are focused on inputs—employers facilitating 
employee savings and investment for retirement. 
Unless you are already retired, you are, or will soon be, 
saving for retirement like the 92.4 million Americans invested in 
mutual funds,10 nearly 75 million of whom do so through defined 
contribution plans.11 “Assets in employer-sponsored DC plans 
have grown more rapidly than assets in other types 
of . . . retirement plans over the past quarter century . . . .”12 
401(k)s and other employer-sponsored defined contribution plans 
held over $5 trillion in assets at the end of 2012.13 The result is a 
retirement revolution that has resulted in a defined contribution 
society, where increasingly the average worker saves for 
retirement by investing in private securities markets and 
becoming a shareholder.14 
                                            
 7. Id. at 15–16, 40–41. 
 8. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 9. See infra Part II.B.1–3; see also Borzi, supra note 4, at A-15 to A-16 
(describing defined contribution plans under ERISA). 
 10. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 91. 
 11. Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 2010 Form 5500 Annual Reports, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 1 (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2010pensionplanbulletin.pdf (summarizing 2010 data 
regarding the number of current defined contribution participants). The 75 million 
figure reflects current participants and does not include former participants who 
have changed jobs or retired and converted accumulated defined contribution benefits 
into an individual savings account (IRA). 
 12. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 116. 
 13. Id. at 94. 
 14. See Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 453–54. 
In a defined contribution society, the policies more likely to be adopted are 
those that channel government subsidies through individual accounts 
controlled by the taxpayer herself. . . . As a result of the increasing 
prevalence of defined-contribution-type programs, upper-middle-class 
taxpayers can in practice undertake all of their financial savings for 
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This growing class of investors—the “citizen 
shareholders”—have commonalities in how they enter the 
market, in what they invest, and why.15 This Article is the 
second of three pieces examining the evolving ways in which 
Americans invest and the causes and consequences of such 
changes. The first article articulated the early concept of the 
citizen shareholder, a definition that is refined and focused in 
this paper, as investors, who enter the securities market 
primarily through self-directed defined contribution plans,16 
invest in mutual or index funds and are saving for long-term 
goals like retirement. Because citizen shareholders invest in 
private securities markets through employer plans, their 
investments are governed by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA),17 in addition to traditional corporate 
governance and securities statutes.18 
The commonalities of how citizen shareholders enter the 
market, the constraints on their ownership rights, and the 
long-term time horizon of their investments distinguish them 
from both direct shareholders, who hold shares in individual 
                                            
retirement, education, and health outlays through tax-favored individual 
account devices. 
Id. 
 15. Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to 
Reflect How and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
1299, 1302–06 (2012) (describing the changing landscape of individual securities 
investment and the resulting category of citizen shareholders). Delaware Chancellor Leo 
Strine has termed these investors the “forced capitalists”: 
[M]ost ordinary Americans have little choice but to invest in the market. They 
are in essence ‘forced capitalists,’ even though they continue to depend for their 
economic security on their ability to sell their labor and to have access to quality 
jobs. These forced capitalists—in whose number I count myself—invest 
primarily for two purposes, both of which are long-term in focus: to send their 
children to college and to provide for themselves in retirement. 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the 
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate 
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007). 
 16. Citizen shareholders enter the market through employer-sponsored retirement 
plans, but when they reach retirement age the plan accumulations will be rolled into 
privately held, but often still, mutual or index funds. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1314. 
Additionally, citizen shareholders may supplement plan holdings by purchasing 
additional securities as a retail investor—someone who purchases mutual or direct funds 
outside of an employer-sponsored plan. Id. at 1301 n.9. The classification of citizen 
shareholder is still meaningful, however, as it describes how investors enter the market, 
their primary purpose, and the conditions upon which they first invest. 
 17. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 297. 
 18. Part III will provide a brief overview of corporate governance and securities 
regulations limitations for citizen shareholders. These issues, however, are largely beyond 
the scope of this paper and will instead be addressed in a third article tracking the 
consequences of the change in how investors enter the market, the protections available 
and the risks assumed. 
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companies, and indirect investors, who own shares in 
investment companies like mutual and index funds.19 
The defined contribution society has created a growing class20 
of citizen shareholders who do not fit neatly into the traditional 
corporate law governance structure.21 Much of the corporate law 
literature and doctrine remains focused on the direct shareholder,22 
a significant group in terms of investing volume, but a group that is 
not representative of the 92.4 million indirect, mutual fund owners 
in the securities market.23 Direct shareholders own stock in 
individual companies such as Coca-Cola or Facebook and exercise 
shareholder information, voting, and exit rights directly.24 In 
contrast, citizen shareholders own stock in mutual or index funds 
that are made up of stock from hundreds of companies, and on 
whose behalf representatives, like mutual fund managers, utilize 
shareholder information and exercise voting and exit rights.25 
Mutual and index funds, as well as hedge funds, are investment 
companies.26 They, together with pension funds, such as CalPERS, 
are referred to as intermediaries in this Article and also as 
institutional shareholders in corporate law literature.27 In teaching 
and thinking about corporate law, I use the following simple 
                                            
 19. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1309. 
 20. “There were 20,035 [defined benefit] plans and 8,587 [defined contribution] 
plans with more than 100 participants in 1975, but only 11,368 [defined benefit] plans 
and 70,125 [defined contribution] plans with more than 100 participants in 2006.” Martin 
Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 
909, 923 (2013). In 2012, $5,057 billion was invested in defined contribution plans such as 
401(k), 403(b), 457, and other plans. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 117. 
 21. Corporate law is an umbrella term under which we examine the role and rights 
of direct shareholders, indirect shareholders, and the institutional shareholders. 
Similarly, both publically owned and privately owned companies are also examined under 
the heading of corporate law. 
 22. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Direct Shareholder Democracy: Reflections on 
Lucian Bebchuck, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 376 (2006); Elizabeth J. Thompson, 
Direct Harm, Special Injury, or Duty Owed: Which Test Allows for the Most Shareholder 
Success in Direct Shareholder Litigation?, 35 J. CORP. L. 215 (2009).  
 23. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 91. 
 24. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1321–29 (describing the consequences of indirect stock 
ownership with respect to traditional shareholder rights). 
 25. As is briefly discussed in Part III and the subsequent paper, representation by 
these managers does not cure the defect because their interests are not perfectly aligned 
with those of citizen shareholders. Id. at 1324. 
 26. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, REPORT TO 
THE HONORABLE HILDA L. SOLIS, U.S. SECRETARY OF LABOR, HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE 
EQUITY INVESTMENTS 9 (2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2011ACReport3. 
pdf. 
 27. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of 
Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 880, 882 (2010) (describing mutual 
funds as diversified institutional shareholders); CalPERS, Facts at a Glance 1 (Sept. 
2013), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/facts-at-a-glance.pdf (reporting 
average monthly pension information). 
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highlights where these regulatory frameworks overlap and 
examines how the defined contribution society shifts risks onto the 
citizen shareholder under ERISA. A future article will focus on the 
structural problems with corporate and securities law.34 The 
shifting risks of market performance, longevity, and information 
have potential to impact retirement security. These risks, 
however, are neither readily apparent to participants nor fully 
understood and are risks that can be better managed once we 
accept the reality, dominance, and import of the citizen 
shareholder.35 
The remainder of this Article is organized in five parts. I 
document the historical and regulatory genesis for the rise of self-
directed defined contribution plans and provide a brief overview of 
ERISA in Part II. In Part III, I briefly summarize the alienation of 
citizen shareholders from traditional corporate law rights, as 
described in earlier works,36 and securities regulations setting up 
inquiries, which will be the focus of the third article. In Part IV, I 
describe the fundamental shifting of risks to employees and 
retirees under the defined contribution framework. In Part V, I 
discuss the limitations of diluted fiduciary standards and 
oversight of self-directed defined contribution plans. Part VI offers 
concluding observations about the overlap of the regulatory 
frameworks and their insufficiencies to serve the interests of 
citizen shareholders. It also offers initial suggestions for structural 
and individual reforms. 
II. EVOLVING INVESTMENT IN THE RETIREMENT REVOLUTION 
Citizen shareholders are the consequence of a retirement 
revolution, and they are also a potential catalyst for corporate law 
reform.37 Changes in tax and retirement benefit laws under ERISA 
                                            
contribution plans, while focusing in particular on investor financial illiteracy and the 
consequences on savings; Fisch, supra note 27, at 879–80, which provides a detailed analysis of 
indirect investors and their limited role in traditional corporate governance mechanisms; 
Gelter, supra note 20, at 911–12, which describes the relationship between defined 
contribution plans increasing the number of investors and the role of markets to push the 
dominance of shareholder primacy; Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of the Social 
Security Administration, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 329–31 (2007), which criticizes investor 
education given the role of self-directed retirement savings and the responsibilities placed on 
individual investors; and Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 455, 458, 473, which notes the rise of the 
defined contribution society, the difference between defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans, the shifting risks with defined contribution plans, and the tax consequences. 
 34. See generally Anne M. Tucker, The Outside Investor: Citizen Shareholders & 
Corporate Law Alienation, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming 2013). 
 35. See infra Part IV. 
 36. See Tucker, supra note 15, at 1308; supra note 34. 
 37. See infra Part III. 
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created and promoted self-directed defined contribution plans, 
like the 401(k), which funneled investors into private 
securities markets.38 Self-directed defined contribution plans 
are the dominant vehicles of individual retirement savings and 
have created both a growing class of employees who invest in 
capital markets and a resulting defined contribution society.39 
Payments from self-directed defined contribution plans are based 
exclusively on the accumulation of contributions (from employees 
and any employer-matching contributions) and investment earnings 
in individual accounts.40 Corporate and securities laws thus govern 
the rights of these investments in private securities markets.41 
Employers provide access to markets through sponsored-benefit 
plans,42 so investors also fall within the regulatory framework of 
ERISA.43 The proliferation of the defined contribution plan, and 
thus the citizen shareholder status, is due in part to the regulatory 
evolution of ERISA since it was enacted in the 1970s.44 This Part 
provides an overview of ERISA and documents the role ERISA 
regulations played in creating and continuing the defined 
contribution trend. 
A. ERISA: History and Purpose 
ERISA, signed into law on Labor Day in 1974,45 was the 
first comprehensive employee benefit legislation in response to  
abuses46 of employer and union retirement plans,47 including   
                                            
 38. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: 
A POLITICAL HISTORY 278–79 (2004) (discussing the shift from defined benefit plans to defined 
contribution plans after ERISA was enacted). 
 39. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 471–72; see INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 114–15 
(examining the increase in assets in defined contribution plans). 
 40. I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006); KOZAK, supra note 4, at 79. 
 41. See, e.g., Borzi, supra note 4, at A-12 (stating ERISA “grants substantive rights to 
employees and their beneficiaries”). 
 42. Throughout this Article, employer sponsors of defined contribution plans are 
referred to as “employers.” 
 43. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006)). 
 44. WOOTEN, supra note 38, at 278. 
 45. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. § 1002). 
 46. “Legislative materials dating to the enactment of ERISA thoroughly illustrate 
congressional concern with protecting plan assets from malfeasance and misuse. 
Representatives recognized the threat posed by the then-existing abuses of pension plan 
assets.” Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA 
Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 398 (2000). ERISA replaced the first legislative 
attempt to regulate pensions in the former attempt of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure 
Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301–309 (1982), repealed by Pub. L. 93-406, Title I, § 111(a)(1), Sept. 2, 1974, 
88 Stat. 851. 
 47. Retirement benefits are voluntary, but once they are promised and if they meet 
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failure of large employers (or unions) to deliver the benefits 
they had promised (whether due to economic reality, 
negligence or malfeasance), improper use of plan assets, 
inadequate advance funding, excessive periods of required 
service as an employee before . . . a portion of the benefits was 
vested . . . and the failure to cover a fair cross-section of lower-
paid employees.48  
The central purpose of ERISA was to “prevent the ‘great 
personal traged[ies]’ of workers whose pension plans terminated 
without having sufficient assets to pay promised benefits.”49 
Defined benefit plans—traditional pension plans where 
retired employees received fixed-sum payments from employers 
based on salary and years of service50—were the predominant 
                                            
the standards of a “qualified plan,” then they are subject to ERISA. Plans are classified 
according to the type of benefit offered. Guaranteed payments provided by the employer after 
retirement, usually based upon a formula of service years and salary, are called defined benefit 
plans. When each employee funds separate retirement savings accounts, often comprised of 
stock investments, by employee contributions and possibly matching contributions by the 
employers, these plans fit the defined contribution model. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-15 to A-16. 
ERISA plans are also categorized according to which entity or entities sponsor a plan. For 
example, ERISA refers to the employer sponsor of the plan as either a single employer sponsor 
(Single Employer Plan), an employee association sponsor (Multiemployer Plan, like a plan 
offered under a collective bargaining agreement), or a multiple employer sponsor (Multiple 
Employer Plan, usually a trade association or national union). Id. at A-14, A-19. ERISA, 
however, also covers what is known as welfare benefit plans, which provide various health, 
disability, and insurance benefits to employees. Id. at A-16 to A-17. Employee welfare plans are 
outside of the scope of this Article. 
 48. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 28. 
 49. Muir, supra note 46, at 398. 
The catalyst for the passage of the ERISA was the shutdown of the Studebaker 
plant in South Bend, Indiana, in 1963, which left many employees without their 
promised pension. After a decade of study by congressional committees, the 
ERISA was introduced by liberal New York Republican Senator Jacob Javits, 
signed into law by President Ford, and became effective on Labor Day, 
September 2, 1974.  
Neil A. Capobianco & José Martin Jara, Hot Topics in ERISA Litigation: From 
Ongoing Class Action Challenges to the Upcoming Fee Disclosure Deluge, RECENT 
CHANGES IN EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, Jan. 2011, 2011 WL 
190437, at *2. ERISA’s regulatory framework intended to balance protections to plan 
participants against undue administrative burdens for (voluntary) employer 
sponsors, as well as maintain plan flexibility. Legislative History of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 94th Cong. (2d Sess. 1976) (introductory 
remarks of Sen. Javits, Member, S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare) (“[M]indful that 
too much regulation . . . might discourage employers from offering plans, Congress 
sought to balance ‘the interests of employers . . . in maintaining flexibility in the 
design and operation of their pension programs and the need of the workers for a 
level of protection which will adequately protect their rights and just expectations.”); 
see also Medill, supra note 33, at 344–45. 
 50. Munnell, supra note 4, at 365 (giving the example of 1.5% of final three-year 
average pay for each year of service, which adds up to 30% of income for an employee 
with a twenty-year employment history with the firm). 
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form of retirement benefit at the time ERISA was enacted51 with 
as many as 80% of employees enrolled in such plans.52 ERISA 
regulations, therefore, focused on rules for funding, preserving, 
and paying those guaranteed benefits.53 At ERISA’s inception 
there were relatively few defined contribution plans, and none 
were self-directed.54 Today, however, self-directed defined 
contribution plans dominate the retirement benefit landscape, 
giving rise to our defined contribution society.55 Defined 
contribution plans involve employer promises to provide 
individual accounts as a savings vehicle for retirement.56 These 
plans include money purchase plans, target benefit plans, profit 
sharing plans, stock bonus and employee stock ownership plans 
(ESOPs), as well as self-directed plans like the 401(k), which are 
the focus of this Article.57 Employee contributions are often 
                                            
 51. “The predominant form of private pension was the defined benefit (DB) plan, 
under which an employee receives a pension of a specified amount upon retirement.” 
Gelter, supra note 20, at 922; see MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 9 (“Technically, 
ERISA’s provisions applied to both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. But the 
main thrust of the legislation was on the defined benefit side.”); see also Steven Sass, The 
Development of Employer Retirement Income Plans: From the Nineteenth Century to 1980, 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME 76, 84 (Gordon L. Clark et 
al. eds., 2007) (noting a “dramatic” expansion of coverage from 15% in 1940 to 
approaching 50% in 1980). 
 52. WOOTEN, supra note 38, at 278. 
 53. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 402(c), 408 (2006); see also Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 475–77 
(discussing ERISA regulations). 
 54. Gelter, supra note 20, at 923, 931; see also WOOTEN, supra note 38, at 279 
(stating that 401(k)s did not exist prior to the enactment of ERISA). 
 55. Gelter, supra note 20, at 931. 
 56. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-15. 
 57. Money purchase plans require the employer to contribute a fixed percentage of 
an employee’s salary to the participant’s account. Choosing a Retirement Plan: Money 
Purchase Plan, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Choosing-a-Retirement-Plan:-
Money-Purchase-Plan (last updated Sept. 3, 2013). In target benefit plans, a form of 
money purchase plans, employers contribute “to each participant’s account an amount 
necessary to provide a target benefit specific in the plan.” Borzi, supra note 4, at A-16. “A 
Profit Sharing Plan or Stock Bonus Plan is a defined contribution plan under which the 
plan may provide, or the employer may determine, annually, how much will be 
contributed to the plan (out of profits or otherwise). The plan contains a formula for 
allocating to each participant a portion of each annual contribution.” Retirement Plans, 
Benefits & Savings: Types of Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
Stock bonus plans usually make contributions and distributions in the form of employer 
stock. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-16. 
  This Article focuses on self-directed defined contribution plans like the 401(k). 
Participants in a 401(k) “can elect to defer receiving a portion of their salary which is 
instead contributed on their behalf, before taxes, to the 401(k) plan. Sometimes the 
employer may match these contributions.” Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings: Types of 
Retirement Plans, supra. 401(k) plans are subject to special rules like contribution limits 
and are sometimes offered in conjunction with profit-sharing plans. Borzi, supra note 4, at 
A-16. In addition to 401(k) plans, there are also 403(b) plans for employees of public 
schools and certain tax-exempt organizations, and certain ministers and 457 plans for 
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invested in securities like mutual funds, and the savings 
accumulated over the working life of the employee, along with 
returns on the investment, are paid to the participant, usually in 
a lump sum, after retirement.58 
B. Influence of ERISA Changes 
Regulatory and social influences over the several decades 
since the enactment of ERISA contributed to the proliferation of 
defined contribution plans.59 A main source of regulatory 
influence came from ERISA, both as originally conceived and 
through the almost forty amendments to it since 1974.60 Four key 
structural changes to ERISA started the trend toward the 
defined contribution society that we have today.61 These changes 
include (1) the creation of the individual retirement account 
(IRA), (2) the heavier regulatory burden imposed on defined 
benefit plans, (3) reduced fiduciary standards for self-directed 
accounts, and (4) relaxed company stock holding rules in defined 
contribution plans.62 Each of these factors is discussed in more 
detail below. These four factors created three direct consequences 
that are the building blocks of my argument. The first is that 
these changes set in motion the decline of the defined benefit and 
the rise of the defined contribution plan. The second is that self-
directed plans, like the 401(k), became the dominant retirement 
vehicle, based in part on the successful model provided by IRAs. 
Third, participants in self-directed accounts rely heavily upon 
mutual and index funds as investment options thus increasing 
their market significance and the number of indirect investors. 
                                            
“certain state and local governments and non-governmental entities tax exempt under 
IRC 501.” 403(b) Plan Basics, supra note 4; IRC 457(b) Deferred Compensation Plans, 
supra note 4. 
 58. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 86. The lump-sum distributions are generally rolled 
over into self-directed IRA accounts or annuities to provide income distributions over 
retirement. See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over 
the Life Cycle and Implications for Regulations, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 
Fall 2009, at 51, 53–54, 85 (discussing the common practice of rolling over retirement 
benefits into a private IRA). 
 59. In addition to the factors discussed in this Part, other contributing factors to the 
decline in the defined benefit plan are the decline of unions and the manufacturing 
industry. “[A] good predictor of whether a firm sponsors a defined benefit plan is whether 
it has a collective bargaining agreement. Another good predictor of defined benefit 
sponsorship (often overlapping with union membership) is whether the firm is engaged in 
traditional manufacturing or extractive activity.” Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 480. 
 60. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 35–37; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, DAVID A. PRATT & SUSAN J. 
STABILE, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 98–104 (2010) (describing forty-three 
post-1974 amendments and enactments that have affected ERISA’s scope). 
 61. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 471. 
 62. Id. at 471–72. 
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From these three consequences the citizen shareholders and the 
defined contribution society were born. 
1. Regulatory Burdens in Defined Benefit Plans. The 
restrictive regulatory environment of defined benefit plans 
spurred growth of the current defined contribution society.63 
Regulatory burdens on defined benefit plans unintentionally 
created incentives for employer sponsors to shift from defined 
benefit plans to defined contribution plans to avoid the additional 
costs and liabilities associated with pension funding 
responsibilities.64 The regulatory burden of plan administration 
and financing was “particularly pronounced for small plans; over 
the period of 1981–96 administrative costs as a percentage of 
payroll nearly tripled for defined benefit plans . . . .”65 Regulatory 
burdens imposed on defined benefit plans, but not defined 
contribution plans, include: (a) minimum funding requirements, 
(b) mandatory vesting standards, (c) contributions to the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and (d) extensive 
fiduciary duties on trustees managing plan assets.66 These 
requirements reduced employer flexibility in managing defined 
benefit plans—flexibility that remains available with defined 
contribution plans.67 
The difference in regulatory burdens between defined benefit 
and defined contribution plans exemplifies the fundamental 
difference between these two types of retirement savings 
systems. Defined benefit plan regulations are concerned 
primarily with outputs—payments to retirees—which fall 
exclusively on the employer sponsor; thus, employers sponsoring 
defined benefit plans are more heavily regulated under ERISA.68 
The defined benefit system placed complete control over 
retirement income with employer sponsors and therefore ERISA 
                                            
 63. See WOOTEN, supra note 38, at 278–79. 
 64. Gelter, supra note 20, at 936 (“The transformation of the American pension 
system came about not through deliberate planning, but largely as an unintended 
consequence of regulation that was primarily intended to protect workers.”). “ERISA 
imposed minimum standards for participation, vesting, and funding that were 
particularly stiff for defined benefit plans.” MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 26. 
 65. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 27. 
 66. Gelter, supra note 20, at 929–30. 
 67. “These often opaque rules limit (and frequently eliminate) any employer 
flexibility in the financing of defined benefit plans.” Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 475. 
Funding minimums, vesting requirements and contributions to the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) are discussed in this Part and fiduciary standards are 
discussed separately in Part V. 
 68. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 86 (“Current defined benefit plans generally are funded 
exclusively with employer contributions . . . .”). 
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coupled that responsibility with additional regulatory oversight.69 
Additionally, nearly annual legislative amendments, agency 
regulations, and advisory opinions increased the costs of 
implementing and complying with regulations of defined benefit 
plans.70 Defined contribution plan regulations, on the other hand, 
focus on inputs since the benefit that is paid is comprised entirely 
of the accumulation of contributions and returns on investment, 
minus administrative costs.71 Additionally, participants in 
defined contribution plans bear most of the costs and the risks of 
the investments whereas employer sponsors bear the costs and 
the risks with defined benefit plans.72 
Minimum funding requirements for defined benefit plans 
serve the fundamental function of ERISA—to ensure delivery of 
promised benefits.73 Employers typically fund defined benefit 
plans by annual contributions based upon the number of 
employees, the amount of benefits to be paid, and the age of 
participants.74 Fiduciaries typically invest those pension funds in 
annuities, stocks, mutual funds, bonds, or some combination 
thereof.75 Funding defined benefit plans is a complex endeavor 
and subject to many factors outside of the employer sponsor’s 
control, such as large market losses.76 As a result, employer 
sponsors are annually required to hire a private sector Enrolled 
Actuary77 who recommends the annual required contribution 
                                            
 69. Id. at 35–37, 79–80. 
 70. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 26 (discussing the frequent legislative 
developments and new defined benefit regulations that result in a complex and costly 
regulatory environment); see also KOZAK, supra note 4, at 35–37 (discussing the numerous 
amendments that have been made to ERISA since enactment). 
 71. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 86 (“The defined contribution model deals exclusively 
with inputs . . . .”). 
 72. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 26 (discussing the frequent legislative 
developments and new defined benefit regulations that result in a complex and costly 
regulatory environment); see infra Part IV; see also KOZAK, supra note 4, at 80 (discussing 
the shift of investment risk in defined contribution versus defined benefit plans). 
 73. Some defined contribution plans, like money purchase plans and target benefit 
plans, are subject to minimum funding rules under ERISA because the employer promises 
to contribute a fixed percentage of compensation. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-17. 
 74. See, e.g., Pension Funding Guidelines, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
BD., www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1209PensionGuidelines.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2013); see also KOZAK, supra note 4, at 113–14 (discussing the information 
actuaries take into consideration in determining whether a plan is properly funded). 
 75. See Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 2010 Form 5500 Annual Reports, 
supra note 11, at 29, 31 (listing the distribution of assets in defined benefit plans). 
 76. See KOZAK, supra note 4, at 112. 
 77. 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(4)(A) (2006). “An Enrolled Actuary is any individual who 
has satisfied the standards and qualifications as set forth in the regulations of the Joint 
Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries as amended, and who has been approved by the 
Joint Board to perform actuarial services required under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).” Enrolled Actuary Information, IRS, 
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based upon the current value of the plan assets and future 
liabilities in relation to current market trends.78 Inaccurate 
funding estimates that result in insufficiently funded plans 
require immediate deposits to cover all liability, and overfunded 
plans yield steep penalty taxes on the excess funds.79 
Employers’ annual contribution requirements depend in part 
on market performance. For example, in a rising market the 
anticipated annual contribution may be offset by returns, or in a 
falling market, losses may increase the estimated contribution.80 As 
a result, employers have difficulty accurately planning for annual 
contribution needs. The volatility of the recommended annual 
contribution affects an employer’s bottom line as well as financial 
statements and reports to investors.81 Consider, for example, the 
dramatic decline of the stock market in 2008, which resulted in 
additional contribution burdens and decreased profits for many 
employer sponsors. Defined contribution plans do not contain 
similar funding requirements or penalties since the employer only 
facilitates employees’ contributions.82 Under self-directed defined 
contribution plans, the employee bears the risk of market loss 
because only the employee is responsible for ensuring that the 
retirement account is adequately funded, not the employer.83 By 
shifting these risks onto employee participants in defined 
contribution plans, employers avoid the uncertainty of funding 
obligations and related balance-sheet adjustments. 
Required contributions to the PBGC84 are another unique 
burden imposed on nearly all defined benefit plans.85 The PBGC 
                                            
http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/Enrolled-Actuaries/Enrolled-Actuary-Information 
(last updated Apr. 15, 2013). 
 78. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 112–13. Enrolled Actuary assumptions include: 
mortality of the participants, interest and fund earnings, disability rates of participants, 
withdrawal rates of participants, future employment rates, increasing age of retirement, 
benefit payment options, dependent or marital status of participants, salary scale and the 
likelihood of disastrous or cyclical events affecting the employer’s industry. Id. at 113–14. 
 79. Id. at 112 (discussing funding inadequacy penalties and tax rates for excessive 
funding of defined benefit plans). 
 80. See id. at 86 (noting that with defined benefit plans, “the risk of large 
investment losses remains with the employer, since lower-than-expected returns or losses 
will simply mean that the employer will need to make larger contributions”). 
 81. Id. (“Because of the required actuarial valuation, the funding requirements are 
sometimes quite volatile from year to year, which not only impacts the actual contribution 
required by the employer, but also can impact the business financial statements.”). 
 82. Id. at 109, 111 (discussing the funding requirements for employer sponsors with 
defined contribution plans). 
 83. For a complete discussion of market performance risks, see Part IV.A. 
 84. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 426. “Under Title IV [of ERISA], certain employers and 
plan administrators must fund an insurance system to protect certain kinds of retirement 
benefits, with premiums paid to the federal government’s [PBGC].” Id. 
 85. Getler, supra note 20, at 930. 
Do Not Delete  9/22/2013 2:49 PM 
170 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [51:1 
bears the risk of a loss of plan assets and employer sponsor 
assets.86 “Insofar as the participant’s pension claim is insured by 
the PBGC, the participant . . . has recourse to the PBGC if the 
employer-issuer becomes insolvent and the collateral (i.e., the 
pension trust assets) becomes inadequate.”87 In the defined 
benefit framework, ERISA imposes obligations on employer 
sponsors to both ensure adequate fund planning through the 
minimum requirements as well as to the payment of insurance 
premiums to the PBGC to ensure employee recourse in the event 
of a plan default.88 There are no similar requirements with 
defined contribution plans and notably no such protections for 
inadequate retirement account funding by individuals since the 
burden to adequately fund retirement savings falls exclusively on 
the employee.89 
Shifting the funding responsibility to employees under 
defined contribution plans and eliminating the PBGC safety net 
removed many of the regulatory burdens imposed on defined 
benefit plans.90 The different regulatory burdens between 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans facilitated the 
decline in pension plans and the rise of 401(k)s, creating the 
first development crucial in establishing the defined 
contribution society.91 
2.  Birth of the Self-Directed Plan—The IRA. The second 
step in establishing the defined contribution society was the 
introduction of self-directed accounts. ERISA attempted to 
address, among other issues, restrictions on and complications  
 
                                            
 86. Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 465–66. The PBGC was created: 
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension 
plans for the benefit of their participants, (2) to provide for the timely and 
uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries under 
plans to which this subchapter applies, and (3) to maintain premiums established by 
the corporation under section 1306 of this title at the lowest level consistent with 
carrying out its obligations under this subchapter. 
 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006). 
 87. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 466. 
 88. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 426. “[L]egal rules that promote security and clarity may 
render benefit promises more costly; in other words, rules may have both desirable and 
undesirable consequences . . . .” Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 435 (2010). 
 89. See, e.g., Steven Wilhelm, Why Boeing’s Fighting to Retire Union, PUGET SOUND 
BUS. J. 1–2 (Jan. 11, 2013, 10:43 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2013/01/ 
10/boeing-union-showdown-looms-on.html?page=all (describing the labor dispute between 
Boeing and its engineers over the proposal elimination of defined benefit for a 401(k) plan in 
light of rising and uncertain retirement costs imposed upon Boeing). 
 90. See supra Part II.A–B.1. 
 91. See supra Part II.A–B.1. 
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of workers’ mobility.92 Defined benefit plans, such as pensions, 
often had long vesting requirements where an employee would 
not receive benefits until after she had worked a significant 
number of years for the company, which stifled job mobility.93 
Additionally, the payment structure for vested benefits after 
termination of employment created undesirable burdens on 
employers94 and tax consequences for employees.95 “Congress 
created the first, or traditional, IRA to have two roles: (1) to give 
workers without retirement plan coverage at work a tax-
advantaged means to save for retirement, and (2) to preserve 
employer-sponsored plan assets by allowing them to be rolled 
over into IRAs at job change or retirement.”96 Originally 
authorized by ERISA in 1974, contributions to IRAs were tax 
deductible for those workers who were not covered by an 
employer-sponsored plan. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 expanded the applicability of IRAs by allowing all 
individuals, whether or not covered by an employer’s plan, to 
                                            
 92. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 40–44 (describing the negative effects of job 
shifting on retirement income in traditional defined benefit plans). 
 93. See id. at 40 (comparing the retirement fund benefits associated with remaining 
at one job for long periods of time versus changing jobs). 
 94. Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 458, 461–67 (explaining the taxes and potential 
risks employers associated with defined benefit plans). 
[Drafters of ERISA] addressed the situation of the vested but younger 
participant who leaves employment prior to his retirement age. Under pre-
ERISA practice, it was common . . . for the (now-terminated) employee to 
receive nothing at the time he severed employment. Rather, he remained 
entitled to a deferred benefit, payable on a delayed basis . . . . For both 
administrative and economic reasons, this delay was often problematic, 
particularly as to relatively young employees. As an administrative matter, 
the plan and the terminated participant had to stay in touch with one 
another for the participant to receive information about the plan and his 
benefit and, ultimately, for the participant to get paid. Such participant 
tracking could be (and still is) resource consuming. 
Id. at 472. 
 95. Id. at 473 (“While this early taxation often occurred at relatively favorable 
rates such early taxation was (often correctly) viewed as diminishing the ultimate 
resources available for the participant’s retirement.”). 
 96. Sarah Holden et al., The Individual Retirement Account at Age 30: A 
Retrospective, 11 PERSPECTIVE 1, 4 (2005), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per11-
01.pdf. 
IRAs were designed with two goals when they were created in 1974 under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). First, they provide 
individuals not covered by workplace retirement plans with an opportunity 
to save for retirement on a tax-advantaged basis on their own. Second, they 
allow workers who are leaving jobs a means to preserve the tax benefits and 
growth opportunities that employer-sponsored retirement plans provide. 
INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 125. 
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make tax deductible contributions to their accounts.97 
With an IRA, employees could transfer a pre-retirement 
distribution from a qualified plan through a “rollover” to an 
IRA.98 Money rolled over in the IRA account grew tax-free until 
the time of withdrawal, which usually occurs at retirement.99 
Rollover rules were expanded so that monies could be transferred 
from one qualified employer plan to another qualified employer 
plan (consolidated rollover).100 For example, if a young associate 
leaves law firm X, she may roll over her benefits to a qualified 
defined contribution plan of law firm Y, or to an IRA where it 
could grow tax-free until retirement. The rollover feature even 
facilitated converting some monies that began as defined benefit 
pension investments into monies invested in an individual IRA or 
another employer’s qualified defined contribution plan.101 Both 
the increasing mobility of American workers102 and the 
consequences of such mobility (converting defined benefit monies 
into defined contribution or IRA monies) contributed to the rise 
of self-directed plans.103 “Traditional IRAs—defined as those IRAs 
first allowed under ERISA—were the most common type of IRA, 
owned by 39 million U.S. households [as of mid-2012],” fueled 
primarily by rollovers.104 The IRA was not just a solution for 
mobile employees; it became an important tax-deferred savings 
vehicle for individuals investing in and outside of employer-
                                            
 97. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 197–98 (Comm. Print 
1981), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=2397 
(detailing the purposes, reasoning, and changes of the Economic Recovery Tax Act); Kelly 
Phillips Erb, Deduct This: History of the IRA Deduction, FORBES (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2011/06/27/deduct-this-history-of-the-ira-
deduction/ (describing the history and evolution of the IRA); The Evolving Role of IRAs in 
U.S. Retirement Planning, ICI RES. PERSP. 1, 3, 5 (Nov. 2009), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/per15-03.pdf (describing the creation of IRAs in 1974 with ERISA 
and later developments with the Economic Recovery Tax Act). 
 98. Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 473–74. 
 99. Id. at 474. 
 100. Rollover IRAs, PERSHING 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.pershing.com/ 
factsheets/rollover_ira_fact_sheet.pdf (illustrating an array of options available to 
employees with IRAs, including the option to rollover funds from one employer plan to 
another). 
 101. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 474 (“Thus, over time, pension based wealth was 
destined to migrate from employer-sponsored plans to the IRAs of former employees”). 
 102. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 42–43 (addressing conflicting scholarly 
views and studies concerning the increasing mobility of American workers). 
 103. Id. at 40–42 (discussing job mobility and negative consequences with respect to 
defined benefit plans and compatibility with defined contribution plans). 
 104. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 126–27 (showing the growing prevalence of 
traditional IRAs after their creation under ERISA). 
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sponsored plans.105 Congress created several different variations 
of the IRA—the Roth IRA, the Health Savings Account, and the 
Education IRA—to encourage individual savings.106 
The tax incentives proved attractive to Americans and 
participation in these plans grew. IRAs familiarized many 
investors with the model of private securities investments for 
long-term savings goals and built examples of success, which 
created both acceptance of and appetite for self-directed 
retirement accounts.107 In 2012, IRA assets totaled $5.4 trillion 
and accounted for 28% of all retirement assets in the United 
States.108 The largest component of IRAs are mutual fund assets, 
totaling $2.5 trillion in 2012, followed closely by individual 
brokerage accounts with $2.1 trillion in assets.109 IRAs are not 
defined contribution plans, but they introduced American 
workers to self-directed accounts and dependence upon 
indirect ownership through mutual funds for long-term 
savings goals.110 In establishing a successful model of self-
                                            
 105. Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 474 (“Roth IRAs, first made available in 1998 under 
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, were owned by almost 19 million U.S. households in mid-
2011. Nearly 9 million U.S. households owned employer-sponsored IRAs (SEP IRAs, SAR-
SEP IRAs, or SIMPLE IRAs).”). As of May 2012, these numbers have increased slightly, 
with 20.3 million U.S. households owning Roth IRAs and 9.2 million households owning 
employer-sponsored IRAs. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 126. 
Congress created the Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) IRA in the Revenue 
Act of 1978 because of concern [regulations were] preventing small employers 
from offering retirement plans to their workers. . . . More recently, in the Small 
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Congress created the Savings Incentive 
Match Plan for Employees, or SIMPLE, IRA, specifically for employers with 100 
or fewer employees. 
Holden et al., supra note 96, at 8 (detailing various versions of the IRA created to spread 
the benefits to all employees). 
 106. I.R.C. §§ 408–408A, 529–530 (2006); see also Medill, supra note 33, at 327–28. ROTH 
IRAs were established in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. “Contributions to Roth IRAs are not 
deductible from current income, but investment earnings may generally be withdrawn tax free 
(features that Congress felt might be appealing to some taxpayers). In addition, the Roth IRA 
does not have a minimum distribution requirement and contributions are allowed after age 
70½.” Holden et al., supra note 96, at 9 (discussing the creation of the Roth IRA and the 
advantages it created under the Taxpayer Relief Act). 
 107. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 474–75 (acknowledging that successful experiences with 
IRAs led to their increased utilization in America); see also Gelter, supra note 20, at 16–18. 
 108. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 125 (analyzing the evolution of IRA use after its 
creation). 
 109. Id. 
IRA owners are more likely to hold mutual funds, especially long-term mutual funds, 
in their IRA portfolios than any other type of investment. Sixty-eight percent of IRA-
owning households had IRA assets invested in mutual funds. About four out of five of 
these households, or 54 percent of all IRA-owning households, held at least a portion 
of their balance in equity mutual funds. 
Id. at 120 (citation omitted). 
 110. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 470–71. 
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directed retirement accounts, IRAs were an important 
benchmark in the evolution of defined contribution plans and 
widespread acceptance of self-directed retirement accounts.111 
Additionally, IRAs marked the beginning of dependence of 
American workers on private securities markets, particularly 
mutual and index funds, as key investment vehicles for long-
term savings goals.112 
3. Reduced Employer Fiduciary Duty for Self-Directed Plans. 
Perhaps the most attractive incentive for employers to create self-
directed defined contribution plans is the relationship between self-
directed accounts (when the employee chooses the investment 
allocations) and the reduction of employer fiduciary duties. 
Employers sponsoring defined benefit plans must comply with a list 
of fiduciary duties owed to the plan and plan participants, violation 
of which exposes the employer, and other designated actors, to 
personal liability for plan losses.113 In contrast, employers (and 
designated actors) are largely immunized, under section 404(c) of 
ERISA, against liability for investment losses resulting from 
participants’ choices in the self-directed accounts regardless of 
whether fiduciary duties were breached.114 
The consequences of reduced fiduciary duty liability are 
discussed in further detail in Part V. To advance the present 
                                            
 111. See id. at 469–71 (noting that IRAs “played a critical role in acclimating Americans 
to the notion of tax-advantaged individual accounts”). 
 112. Gelter, supra note 20, at 17 (noting that employers funding defined benefit 
pension plans typically invest funds for the plan in securities markets, commonly in 
mutual, index, and other indirect investment vehicles); Usha Rodrigues, Corporate 
Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
1822, 1830 (2011). Pension funds are a form of institutional investor and wield significant 
market power. See generally INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 11, 39, 108 (describing 
pension plans as investors in the markets and describing asset holdings). 
 113. Capobianco & Jara, supra note 49, at *2–5. 
A fiduciary may be expressly named in the plan documents or designated as 
such by the board of directors of the plan’s sponsor. However, the statute does 
not limit the scope of fiduciary status to those who are expressly given the 
label. . . . [C]ourts [must] determine who is performing—or has the authority to 
perform—the discretionary functions that give rise to fiduciary status. 
Accordingly, if a person exercises or has any discretionary authority or control 
over plan administration or assets, that person will likely be a de facto ERISA 
fiduciary charged with the same responsibilities and subject to the same 
liabilities as any expressly identified fiduciary. The ERISA’s test is fact-
intensive and must be construed broadly in order to effectuate the ERISA’s 
purposes. 
Id. at *2. 
 114. Gelter, supra note 20, at 17. “ERISA encouraged the creation of ‘participant-
directed’ DC plans because the employer or other persons designated as or deemed to be 
fiduciaries are not liable for investment losses that result from the beneficiaries’ choices.” 
Id. 
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argument, it is sufficient to note that the difference in the 
liability structure between defined benefit and contribution plans 
created another incentive for employers to offer defined 
contribution plans as opposed to defined benefit plans and to 
make those plans self-directed.115 These incentives contributed to 
the growth of the defined contribution society we have today. 
4. Additional Regulatory Incentives for Defined 
Contribution Plans. In addition to the fundamental regulatory 
differences between defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans, ERISA creates several additional incentives for employers 
to offer or convert pension plans to the defined contribution 
model. Overfunded defined benefit plans, where employers 
continued making aggressive contributions to the plan even in 
strong market years, became a source of cash for the corporation 
or a potential acquirer. Terminating a defined benefit plan and 
recasting it as a defined contribution plan allows employer 
sponsors to recapture the overinvested assets dedicated to the 
pension plan.116 The potential cash assets in overfunded pension 
plans made the employer sponsors potential targets for hostile 
takeovers.117 Compare this with defined contribution plans, which 
can be a useful corporate deterrent against hostile take-overs.118 
Defined contribution plan rules allow employers to offer their 
own stock to employee participants as a part of an ESOP,119 and 
                                            
 115. Id. at 19. 
Firms used the opportunity to terminate DB plans and create DC plans instead, 
while taking the excess value of the plan assets (over the net present value of 
the pension payments) into corporate profits. Legally, plan terminations were 
made possible by a 1983 ruling by the IRS (encouraged by the Department of 
Labor), which clarified that plan terminations were not only permissible in 
narrow cases of ‘business necessity,’ but generally as long as the employer 
bought an annuity for the existing benefits from an insurance company. 
Id. 
 116. Id.; see MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 27. IRS code amendments in the late 
1980s tried to “protect plans from terminations by imposing a reversion tax. However, the long-
term effect was to make DB plans even more unattractive to employers, who reacted by 
reducing the target funding ratios and ultimately by converting DB plans into cash balance 
plans, which allowed them to avoid the tax penalty.” Gelter, supra note 20, at 20. 
 117. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 27 (recognizing that overfunded 
pension plans created a balance sheet asset that made companies takeover targets, 
especially after the plan termination rules allowed it). 
 118. Gelter, supra note 20, at 31 n.189, 35 (tracing the changing environment 
towards hostile takeovers and their effect on the growth of defined contribution 
plans). 
 119. José Martin Jara, What Is the Correct Standard of Prudence in Employer 
Stock Cases?, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 541, 548 (2012). “To qualify as an ESOP, the 
plan must be ‘designed to invest primarily in employer stock.’” Id. 
[Defined contribution plans] would supplant defined-benefit pension plans 
as the primary source of employee retirement income. Hence Congress did 
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that stock can be voted with management to fend off a hostile 
takeover.120 Where defined benefit plans made an employer 
sponsor a hostile takeover target, defined contribution plans 
could be a shield against such takeovers. Finally, employers 
are better able to shift administrative costs of employee 
participants under defined contribution rather than defined 
benefit plans creating additional incentives with the defined 
contribution, rather than the defined benefit, model.121 
The difference in the regulatory framework between 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans provided 
incentives for employers to offer defined contribution plans 
over defined benefit plans.122 The result is best described by 
Professor Zelinsky as 
a quiet, largely unheralded revolution, a revolution it 
has been, incrementally but fundamentally changing 
the manner in which Americans think about tax and 
social policy and in which their governments formulate 
such policy. Like any other paradigm shift, the 
emergence of the defined contribution society has 
both opened opportunities and foreclosed possibilities.123 
The incentives to convert defined benefit plans into 
defined contribution plans along with the development of IRAs 
gave rise to the second trend—the evolution of defined 
contribution plans and the acceptance of self-directed defined 
contribution plans where employees bore market risks and 
employers enjoyed reduced fiduciary duties.124 Additionally, 
with the rise of self-directed defined contribution plans came 
the corresponding dependence of participants on private 
securities markets, particularly in the form of mutual and 
index funds.125 
                                            
not extend the 10 percent limit on employer stock holdings to 401(k) plans. 
Employers thus have much latitude in determining how much employer 
stock employees may hold in their 401(k). 
James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Are Empowerment and 
Education Enough? Underdiversification in 401(k) Plans, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECON. ACTIVITY, 2005, No. 2, at 151, 155. 
 120. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2008) (discussing the responsibilities of 
fiduciaries, especially within the proxy voting role). 
 121. See infra Part V. 
 122. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 475–77. 
 123. Id. at 454 (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. at 474–77. 
 125. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 128; Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1830. 
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III. CITIZEN SHAREHOLDERS AND THE ALIENATION FROM 
CORPORATE LAW 
The emerging defined contribution society created a unique 
class of investors—the citizen shareholder who predominantly 
invests in mutual or index funds.126 These investors, however, do 
not fit neatly within the traditional corporate law framework, 
which balances shareholder accountability with management 
authority.127 Nor do the reporting and disclosure requirements 
under securities regulations reach citizen shareholders in a 
meaningful way.128 As discussed above in Part III, ERISA’s 
original purpose of securing defined benefit plans created a 
system of reduced fiduciary standards and regulatory oversight 
for defined contribution plans.129 Many of the intended 
protections of traditional corporate law, securities regulations, 
and the original ERISA framework do not fully extend to citizen 
shareholders invested through defined contribution plans.130 The 
following Part briefly outlines the unique attributes of defined 
contribution investors and summarizes the resulting 
incompatibilities with corporate and securities law, which are 
discussed in more detail in a separate article.131 
The rise of the defined contribution society and the 
dependence on self-directed investment accounts resulted in an 
increasing number of Americans invested in the stock market as 
their primary form of retirement savings.132 While there are 
individual differences among many investors (i.e., priority, time 
horizon, risk tolerance, level of diversification), citizen 
                                            
 126. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1308. 
 127. Id. at 1310, 1324–25. 
 128. The 1933 Securities Act focuses on issuance of securities from the issuing 
company and sold directly to shareholders. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, 
Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 912 
935–39 (2005) (explaining the events that led to the creation of the various securities laws 
and the Securities Exchange Commission). These sales and their required disclosure and 
registration requirements are outside of the typical investment vehicle utilized by citizen 
shareholders. Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1828–29. The 1934 Securities Act focuses 
primarily on the secondary market and the related required disclosures, as well as proxy 
access. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 526, 532 
(1990). The disclosures and the proxy access rights are exercised by direct shareholders, not 
indirect shareholders. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1300–02, 1321. The observations stated in this 
Part regarding the limited applicability these direct shareholder mechanisms have on indirect 
owners are consistent with the limitations of corporate governance mechanisms described 
herein. 
 129. See supra Part II. 
 130. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1309, 1316, 1324. 
 131. Tucker, supra note 34. 
 132. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 94. 
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shareholders have commonalities in how they enter the 
market,133 their investment in indirect funds, and a rational 
preference for long-term growth to fund future retirement.134 That 
citizen shareholders are indirect shareholders is a consequence of 
the relationship between the rise of self-directed defined 
contribution accounts and the resulting dependence upon mutual 
and index funds as a primary investment vehicle for these plans. 
Indirect shareholders have a complicated status in 
corporate law. They have indirect voting and information 
rights meaning that they get information and voting rights 
only through the fund in which they are invested, not in the 
operating companies in which the fund is invested.135 Indirect 
shareholders own stock in a mutual or index fund; the mutual 
or index fund in turn invests in hundreds of operating 
companies including, for example, Coca-Cola. The mutual 
fund, as the direct shareholder, votes in annual director 
elections as well as various proxy proposals and end-of-
company life decisions, such as whether or not to approve a 
merger.136 Direct shareholders also receive annual operating 
company information before voting and, when dissatisfied with 
the company performance or policy, can exit by selling shares 
on the market and investing in a suitable alternative.137 
Indirect owners, however, have diluted rights as compared to 
the direct shareholder. Indirect stock ownership distorts 
traditional rights held by direct shareholders such as voting, 
disclosure, and exit rights in operating companies. Indirect 
investors receive information about the intermediary mutual 
fund and vote in fund elections but do not receive information or 
voting rights from Coca-Cola or the other operating companies in 
                                            
 133. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1313–14 (describing how employer-sponsored defined 
contribution plans are a common entry point for investors into the securities markets with 72% 
of first-time mutual fund purchases after 2005 occurring within defined contribution plans). 
 134. Id. at 1317–21 (describing citizen shareholders’ rational preference for market 
performance rather than company-specific performance given their diversification and 
long-term savings goals); see also Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 583–85 (2006) (discussing the role of market 
performance with diversified portfolios and the concept of the universal investor); cf. 
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 8–9, 69–70 (2012) (discussing shareholder 
heterogeneity). 
 135. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1322–24. 
 136. See Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988) (requiring mutual funds to follow 
guidelines when “giving a proxy, consent, or authorization in respect of any security”); 
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1–240.14b-2 (1990); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1990) (enumerating the 
rules under which proxy agreements must be undertaken); see also MARK SARGENT & 
DENNIS HONABACH, PROXY RULES HANDBOOK, § 2:12 (2011) (describing proxy voting 
rules); Black, supra note 128, at 536–41 (describing shareholder notice and voting rules). 
 137. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1310, 1323–24. 
Do Not Delete  9/22/2013 2:49 PM 
2013] RETIREMENT REVOLUTION 179 
which the fund is invested.138 “[T]he corporation’s vote holder is not 
the ultimate beneficial owner of the corporation, but instead an 
intermediary that enables the investor to own an interest in a mix 
of shares packaged as a unitary investment vehicle.”139 
Regarding disclosures that reach indirect investors through 
intermediaries, research suggests that inundation of disclosures 
decreases the effectiveness of disclosed information because of 
competing noise.140 Additionally, the rational apathy of 
shareholders, particularly indirect owners, makes corporate reforms 
to increase shareholder accountability like say-on-pay symbolic, but 
ineffective, tools to give indirect shareholders meaningful 
participation rights in corporate governance.141 The diluted 
information rights of indirect owners also affect exit rights—where 
the choice to leave is prompted by timely and accurate information, 
which indirect owners do not receive. Additionally, indirect owners 
cannot sell just their indirect interest in one operating company, but 
they must sell their interest in the entire fund.142 
Indirect shareholders are distanced from many power-
balancing mechanisms in corporate law and securities disclosures 
intended to protect shareholder interests. Instead, they must rely 
on the intermediary, like a mutual fund, to adequately represent 
and protect their interests.143 Intermediaries, often in the form of 
                                            
 138. See, e.g., Black, supra note 128, at 523–24, 536–37 (describing direct 
shareholder notice and voting rules); Taub, supra note 32, at 851 (“[Mutual fund 
participants] take[] the economic risk, but [they are] not the legal owner of the mutual 
fund or the underlying portfolio companies. In this way, [the investors are] distanced even 
more from the location of control over the capital [they have] at risk.”); see also Tucker, 
supra note 15, 1323–24, 1327–28 (comparing direct and indirect shareholders’ voting and 
information rights). 
 139. Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1828–29. 
 140. Id. at 1853–55 (describing disclosures as failures because additional disclosures 
are “noisy” and “easy for investors to ignore” and offer little by the way of tangible result). 
 141. See Black, supra note 128, at 523–24 (discussing indirect shareholder passivity). 
 142. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1328. 
 143. See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents 
and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (2006) (arguing 
that the mutual fund “industry’s faults can be found in the idiosyncratic structure of 
mutual funds, a structure that exacerbates the ability of managers to wield substantial 
power and to use that power to extract rents both overtly and surreptitiously from 
shareholders”); Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of 
Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 322–23 
(2011) (describing the power of mutual fund managers due to the size of votes they 
represent). 
Interestingly, mutual funds . . . have been described as ‘relatively docile 
shareholders’ because they rarely engage in activism. . . . Some observers have 
criticized possible conflicts of interest of mutual fund managers. Arguably 
they are sometimes inclined to please corporate managers, who are in the 
position to direct employees’ 401(k) wealth to investment companies that do 
not object to the firm’s corporate governance practices. There is some evidence 
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mutual funds and other institutional shareholders, represent 
citizen shareholders and other indirect owners. A history of mutual 
funds’ preference for passivity over shareholder activism and 
consistent support of management proposals are two reasons why 
the representative capacity of mutual funds is called into question 
as having misaligned interests with those of its investors.144 The free 
rider problem also discourages mutual funds from bearing costs of 
shareholder activism when they cannot secure the sole benefit for 
those efforts.145 Similarly, the hope that other institutional 
shareholders may incur the costs and take a leadership role is also a 
powerful disincentive to activism.146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
that business ties make mutual funds vote in a more manager-friendly way, 
but it is not unambiguous. 
Gelter, supra note 20, at 38. 
 144. James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and 
Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 7, 46 (2010) (finding that 
mutual funds delegate voting decisions to professional proxy services and 
“consistently” side with management); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the 
Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 295 (2012) 
(describing problems of short-term and long-term time horizon conflicts); Alan R. 
Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1419, 1430–31 (2002) (summarizing academic studies concluding that mutual 
funds are passive investors); Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1830–31 (“[Mutual funds 
hold] stock in myriad companies and therefore lack the incentive to expend research 
costs in determining which votes in which particular companies would most increase 
value. In addition, investments in mutual funds are highly liquid, meaning that a 
mutual fund investor discontented with a fund’s performance can withdraw her 
money at any time.”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short 
Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148, 149 (1990) (finding the 
benefits of long- and short-term arbitrage while also disclosing the risk associated 
with them). For a comprehensive discussion on noise trading, see Fischer Black, 
Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 529–41 (1986) (evaluating both the adverse and beneficial 
aspects of trading on noise). 
 145. Roberta Romano, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in 
the US, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE US AND EUROPE: WHERE ARE WE NOW? 55 
(Geoffrey Owen et al. eds., 2006) (shedding light on restrictions to shareholder 
activism); see also Dallas, supra note 144, at 270 (discussing the problems managers 
face when confronted by a lack of information). 
 146. Fisch, supra note 27, at 881–84 (observing the consequences of “slicing and 
dicing” corporate ownership interests). 
Indirect 
Investors 
Defined 
Contribution 
Investors 
Citizen 
Shareholders 
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Under my definition, citizen shareholders are likely to be 
indirect, rather than direct, shareholders.147 The limitations of 
indirect shareholder status are further exacerbated with citizen 
shareholders because they have reduced choice in whether or not to 
invest.148 Tax incentives, opt-in rules that promote participation in 
401(k)s, and the lack of other viable retirement savings alternatives 
tip the scales in favor of investment and reduce an individual’s 
“choice” as to participation. Second, the menu options of 
investments within plans—often mutual or index funds along with 
money market, bonds, or company stock149—alter investment choice 
for citizen shareholders as well. Within the universe of restricted 
choice, citizen shareholders invest heavily in mutual or index funds, 
which fuel the growth of indirect shareholders.150 Limited choice 
between investment options in the defined contribution menus 
restrict citizen shareholders’ ability to exit.151 In the contained 
                                            
 147. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1302. “The spread of 401(k) plans contributed to 
the enormous expansion of the mutual funds industry, where much of these savings 
are invested.” Gelter, supra note 20, at 38. 
Mutual fund ownership has become so widespread largely because mutual 
funds are a primary way that Americans save for retirement. Defined-
contribution retirement plans and Individual Retirement Accounts often 
hold mutual funds, and the rapid growth of these plans and accounts has 
increased mutual funds’ total share of retirement assets. Mutual funds now 
hold approximately a quarter of America’s retirement savings.  
Molly Mercer, Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Worthless Warnings? Testing the 
Effectiveness of Disclaimers in Mutual Fund Advertisements, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 429, 432 (2010) (arguing that mutual funds are the most predominate vehicles 
for saving for retirement). 
 148. See Medill, supra note 33, at 333 (discussing the role of automatic 
enrollment and other incentives to participate in defined contribution plans); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1393 (2011) 
(describing the consequences of automatic enrollment defaults with defined 
contribution plans and how they increased participation by altering participants’ 
choice). 
 149. See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 117–18 (describing defined 
contribution asset allocations in equities, funds, company stock, bonds and money 
market accounts). 
 150. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1322–23 & n.111. An index mutual fund is “[a] fund 
designed to track the performance of a market index. The fund’s portfolio of securities is either 
a replicate or a representative sample of the designated market index. Often referred to as 
passively managed portfolios.” INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 226. A mutual fund is 
[a]n investment company registered with the SEC that buys a portfolio of securities 
selected by a professional investment adviser to meet a specified financial goal 
(investment objective). Mutual funds can have actively managed portfolios, where a 
professional investment adviser creates a unique mix of investments to meet a 
particular investment objective, or passively managed portfolios, in which the adviser 
seeks to track the performance of a selected benchmark or index. 
Id. at 228. 
 151. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1327. 
While others have argued that the fungible nature of mutual funds makes it an 
Do Not Delete  9/22/2013 2:49 PM 
182 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [51:1 
universe of a 401(k) plan offering a limited array of investment 
options, the indirect owner must find an alternative fund that 
does not invest in Coca-Cola and offers a similar risk and 
diversification portfolio.152 Exit rights are also constrained for 
citizen shareholders because of the likely absence of a suitable 
alternative investment within the plan.153 
Additionally, the question of aligned interests between 
mutual fund managers and investors is exacerbated by citizen 
shareholder status. Citizen shareholders who are saving for 
retirement have a presumed long-term investment horizon and 
want to achieve sustained growth over a period of time.154 This 
long-term time horizon may be in conflict with investment 
horizons of mutual fund managers where the models of 
performance evaluation and compensation drive short-term 
time horizons at the funds.155 The nature of defined 
contribution plan structures further complicates the question 
of aligning interests. Employer sponsors of defined 
contribution plans are often seen as the “client” of the mutual 
                                            
even more liquid asset than investment in an individual company and therefore 
contains strengthened exit rights, this view does not take into account the 
realities of how a majority of investors enter and remain in the market. 
Id.; see John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and 
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 88, 102–05 (discussing 
enhanced exit rights of mutual fund investors who withdraw cash from the fund’s assets 
whereas the sale of direct stock does not affect the assets of the company); see also Strine, 
supra note 15, at 11 (“[S]cholars would say that the ability of mutual fund investors to get 
their money out at net asset value whenever they want gives them a protection that the 
stockholders of operating companies do not have. But that retort seems hollow. The net 
asset value of my mutual fund simply reflects the market value of its investments, most of 
which are in the stock of publicly traded operating corporations.”). 
 152. See Tucker, supra note 15, at 1329 n.142 (describing investment risk and 
diversification options within a given defined contribution plan). 
 153. “[T]he idea that investors have more real choice in mutual fund investments 
than they have in operating company investments is hardly self-evident.” Strine, supra 
note 15, at 7. 
 154. See Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1830 (“Actively managed mutual funds 
attempt to beat the market by investing in stocks that appreciate faster than average.”). 
But see Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 144, at 149 (arguing that making multiple short 
term arbitrage trades can actually be less risky and lead to more growth than long term 
trades). In one study, two authors sought to establish the harm of real earnings 
management relative to accrual earning management by studying the cost of capital. 
Jeong-Bon Kim & Byungcherl Charlie Sohn, Real Earnings Management and Cost of 
Capital, 32 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2013). Their study concluded that real 
earnings management distorts the role of earnings as an indicator of a firm’s true future 
cash flows and thus exacerbates information problems faced by outside investors to a 
greater extent than does accrual earnings management. Id. (manuscript at 2, 21–22). 
 155. Taub, supra note 32, at 867–72 (2009) (describing in detail conflicts of interests 
between managers and indirect owners); see also Dallas, supra note 144, at 272–73 
(describing managers’ tactics to increase compensation, bonuses, and performance 
evaluations based upon short-term performance which may create detrimental long-term 
effects within the fund and the invested-in companies). 
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fund and their interests are served over the interests of 
individual citizen shareholders.156 
 
A growing group of Americans are encouraged through tax 
incentives and automatic enrollment programs to invest in the stock 
market through defined contribution plans for retirement savings; 
but once invested, they enjoy a fraction of the investor protections 
assumed to balance the playing field and help promote and protect 
nest eggs.157 Citizen shareholders are not investing in an open 
market but instead choosing among a limited range of investment 
vehicles.158 A worker’s decision to invest diverted compensation in 
one of approximately twenty mutual, index, or bond funds through 
an automatic-enrollment 401(k) is materially different from an 
individual investor placing discretionary savings in the market 
where participation, investment choice and exit are not 
constrained.159 The problems of indirect ownership status are 
intensified with citizen shareholders and raise questions regarding 
the reach and applicability of corporate governance and securities 
regulations intended to protect investors.160 
IV. SHIFTING RISKS ONTO CITIZEN SHAREHOLDERS IN THE 
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SOCIETY 
Citizen shareholders have an additional set of protections 
outside of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms of 
voting, information, and exit rights, and securities regulations. 
Citizen shareholders, because they enter the stock market 
through employer-sponsored defined contribution plans, have the 
statutory rights and protections provided under ERISA, which 
governs employer-provided benefits.161 This Part discusses how 
conversion from defined benefit to self-directed defined 
contribution plans shifts significant risks onto participants, risks 
which have the potential to undermine individual and national 
retirement security. 
ERISA, enacted in 1974, focused primarily on defined benefit 
                                            
 156. “[T]he [mutual fund] industry’s true customers are not individual investors, but 
rather portfolio companies that can decide how to allocate their employee-thrift business.” 
Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 144, at 9. 
 157. Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1828–29, 1836, 1859–60. 
 158. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1328–29, 1336–40 (describing investment options 
within a defined contribution plan and describing the mutual funds included in defined 
contribution plans offered by the three case study companies Wal-Mart, IBM and Well-
Point discussed in the article). 
 159. Id. at 1303–04. 
 160. For a further discussion of these issues, see Tucker, supra note 34. 
 161. See supra note 31 (discussing the protections provided under ERISA). 
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pensions, the most common form of retirement benefits at that 
time.162 As previously described, under defined benefit plans, the 
responsibility of funding and paying retirement benefits to 
retirees rested solely on the employer.163 With this responsibility 
came great risk: risk of bankruptcy and underfunded pensions 
that could leave retirees with inadequate retirement income and 
could jeopardize the financial stability of the country.164 With 
great risk came strong regulation, as discussed in Part II.165 In 
order to ameliorate both the risk and the regulatory burdens 
borne under defined benefit plans, employers gradually shifted 
the risk of funding and administering retirement benefits onto 
employees by adopting and proliferating self-directed defined 
contribution plans.166 In our defined contribution society, we 
are left with the question: If the purpose of ERISA is 
protecting workers’ retirement benefits, is that purpose best 
served by shifting risks onto the workers and reducing both 
oversight and safety nets for retirement savings? 
Under a self-directed defined contribution model, three 
important risks are shifted to employee investors—market 
performance, information risks, and longevity risks.167 In 
shifting these responsibilities to employees, these risks also 
became largely unregulated.168 In contrast, under the defined 
benefit model, employers bore these risks and were the subject 
of extensive ERISA regulations.169 The few ERISA protections 
that remain in place for self-directed defined contribution 
plans are eliminated170 once an employee retires or changes 
                                            
 162. See Gelter, supra note 20, at 922 (“The predominant form of private pension was 
the defined benefit (DB) plan, under which an employee receives a pension of a specified 
amount upon retirement.”). 
 163. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing defined benefit plans). 
 164. See supra note 49. 
 165. Supra Part II. 
 166. See Gelter, supra note 20, at 923 (discussing the change from defined benefit to 
defined contribution plans). 
 167. See infra Part IV.A–C (describing each risk in detail). 
 168. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 9 (“The defining characteristic of 401(k) 
plans is that they shift the risks and responsibilities associated with providing retirement 
income from the employer to the employee. Shifting the risk means that employees both 
enjoy the gains and suffer the losses of their investment decisions.”); Zelinsky, supra note 
5, at 458 (“[D]efined contribution arrangements shift the risk of poor (and the rewards of 
better) investment performance to the employee, because her entitlement under the plan 
is her account balance, however low (or high) that balance might be.”). 
 169. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory burdens 
and risks). 
 170.  
[U.S.] retirees effectively have fewer regulatory protections than do most 
workers. This is an unintended consequence of the nation’s system of defined-
contribution retirement savings. . . . However, almost all retirees eventually roll 
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jobs and moves the investment into a private account such as 
an IRA.171 
Regardless of the reader’s normative view of the efficacy of 
the defined contribution society, it is unquestionably in place and 
shapes how a majority of Americans invest in the market as well 
as the financial security of both individuals and our nation. One 
consequence of the retirement revolution is the shifting of 
significant risks onto participants, risks that were borne by 
employers and federally backed safety nets like the PBGC under 
the pension paradigm. Risk should be a critical component of 
debates about the role of citizen shareholders in our markets, 
securities regulations, and corporate governance regimes. This 
model of retirement savings poses a unique set of risks for 
investors entering the market—risks that are not lessened under 
the ERISA regulatory framework. The following Part describes 
the limitations of the ERISA framework with regard to citizen 
shareholders. 
A. Market Performance Risks 
In a defined contribution society, the individual financial 
security of many Americans and the general financial security of 
our country in future decades are inextricably intertwined with 
the success of capital markets.172 The most dramatic risk shifted 
from defined benefit to self-directed defined contribution plans is 
that participants bear the risks of market performance. 
Under the defined benefit paradigm, employers’ pension 
funds were often invested heavily in securities markets, and 
thus, employers bore the risk of market performance.173 In other 
                                            
their accumulated balances out of ERISA-regulated accounts into Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), which are regulated with a much lighter touch. For 
example, the broker-dealer securities firms that manage most IRAs have no 
fiduciary duty toward their customers. Thus, the system currently provides the 
least regulation for precisely the age group with the greatest vulnerability. 
Agarwal et al., supra note 58, at 53–54. 
 171. Medill, supra note 33, at 343. 
In 2004, assets held in IRAs were valued at $3.48 trillion. By comparison, assets 
held in all employer-sponsored defined contribution plans (primarily 401(k) 
plans) were valued at $2.68 trillion in 2004. These numbers suggest that IRAs, 
not employer-sponsored plans, will be the most significant source of non-Social 
Security income for future retirees. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 172. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 68 (“[R]etirement income in 401(k) plans 
depends on the success of the participant’s investment choices. Moreover, most 
participants’ financial security in retirement rests on these choices because the 401(k) 
often represents the bulk of the family’s financial assets.”). 
 173. See KOZAK, supra note 4, at 86 (“In all types of defined benefit plans . . . the risk 
of large investment losses remains with the employer.”). 
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words, if the market declined it was the pension fund/employer 
that had to make up the difference, not the retiree. Most 
employees enrolled in self-directed defined contribution plans 
depend upon average market returns to build retirement savings 
over a lifetime.174 As discussed above, mutual funds are a popular 
investment vehicle for individual investors fueled, in part, by the 
rise in self-directed defined contribution plans.175 Defined 
contribution plans also offer investment options other than 
mutual funds, such as bonds, money market accounts, and 
company stock, but mutual and index funds are the most 
appealing option because they satisfy portfolio diversification 
needs.176 Citizen shareholders bear the risks of their investments 
(i.e., a negative return) without robust traditional shareholder 
protections and without the benefit of an employer-provided 
safety net, or the PBGC,177 as exists under defined benefit 
plans.178 
B. Information Risks 
Related to portfolio performance and market risks are 
investment information access and asymmetry risks. Information 
risks include the ability to assess the market and make investment 
decisions that generate long-term returns as well as demonstrate 
general financial literacy.179 In defined benefit models, employers, 
designated trustees, or paid investment advisors oversee pension 
                                            
 174. Gelter, supra note 20, at 928 (noting that “[p]otential retirees are therefore to a 
large extent dependent on the development of the stock market, and to a lesser extent, of 
the bond market,” and the reason for the dominance of equity is that “it is the only type of 
investment that yields profits that are high enough ‘to make retirement income programs 
work’” (citation omitted)). 
 175. See supra note 50. 
 176. See Beginners’ Guide to Asset Allocation, Diversification, and Rebalancing, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/assetallocation.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
Because achieving diversification can be so challenging, some investors may find it 
easier to diversify within each asset category through the ownership of mutual funds 
rather than through individual investments from each asset category. A mutual fund 
is a company that pools money from many investors and invests the money in stocks, 
bonds, and other financial instruments. Mutual funds make it easy for investors to 
own a small portion of many investments. A total stock market index fund, for 
example, owns stock in thousands of companies. 
Id. 
 177. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 47–49; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 84–89 (discussing investment risks and the PBGC). 
 178. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 47 (“One type of financial risk is the 
possibility that the real rate of return will fall below historic norms during the accumulation 
phase. That is, if the stock market falls, the sponsor of a defined benefit plan must cover 
promised benefits. In a 401(k) plan, the participant suffers the loss.”). 
 179. See Medill, supra note 33, at 329, 333 (describing investors’ need of “the motivation 
and knowledge necessary to save and invest”). 
Do Not Delete  9/22/2013 2:49 PM 
2013] RETIREMENT REVOLUTION 187 
fund investment decisions.180 Under a self-directed defined 
contribution model, in contrast, the individual employee allocates 
investments within the options offered by the plan; thus, the 
information risk passes to the individual.181 Shifting the information 
risk to individual participants is problematic because of information 
asymmetries, general financial illiteracy, current methods of 
providing investor education, and greater likelihood of bad decisions 
with insufficient information. The decisions involved in self-directed 
retirement investments implicate high information costs,182 and the 
consequences of poor decisions have the potential to be individually 
and socially disastrous. 
Citing to a 2004 study, Professor Lusardi concluded that 
“workers continue to be uninformed about the rules and the benefits 
associated with their [retirement benefits], despite the large 
shift . . . from [defined benefit] to [defined contribution] plans, which 
has [given] workers more [retirement savings] responsibility.”183 In a 
comprehensive review of the efficacy of investment warnings, 
Professor Palmiter surveyed existing consumer behavior and 
knowledge research, concluding that: 
These studies paint an unflattering portrait of the typical 
mutual fund investor. They find that fund investors 
generally are uninformed and financially 
unsophisticated. For example, most investors are 
unaware of the investment objectives, composition, fees 
and expenses, and risks of their funds. Although 
investors pay little attention to a fund’s objectives, risk, 
and costs, they pay great attention to a fund’s historical 
returns.184 
The information deficit by self-directed defined contribution 
participants is not wholly unaddressed by ERISA; employers are 
                                            
 180. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 458 (discussing employer investment responsibility under 
defined benefit plans). 
 181. See KOZAK, supra note 4, at 86 (“In all types of defined contribution plans, 
the risk of large investment losses . . . remains with each individual participant.”). 
 182. Medill, supra note 33, at 333 (“Retirement financial planning involves high 
information costs in determining and assessing available options, and then using 
those options to manage various types of financial risks.” (citation omitted)); see also 
id. at 334–35 (discussing high information costs of investment decisions and coping 
mechanisms for participants such as the endorsement effect, framing effects, and 
risk/loss aversion). 
 183. Annamaria Lusardi, Household Savings Behavior in the United States: The 
Role of Literacy, Information, and Financial Education Programs, in POLICYMAKING 
INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 109, 121 (Christopher L. Foote et al. eds., 
2009). 
 184. Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 147, at 432 (citation omitted). 
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required to provide participants with account statements.185 In 
addition, plan participants receive a Summary Annual Report186 and 
notices regarding portfolio diversification, automatic enrollment (if 
applicable), default investment options (if applicable), and fees.187 
Disclosures, while politically expedient solutions, pose problems in 
application and effectiveness.188 Additional disclosures, in 
conjunction with the countless other forms of notice, are considered 
“noisy” and “easy for investors to ignore,” often generating 
compliance costs and sources of litigation but little in way of 
applicability to the end-user.189 
The information asymmetry is not just an absence of 
information; it is also an absence of knowledge about how to 
process available information.190 Financial illiteracy of many 
participants191 is “particularly acute among specific 
demographic groups such as women, African-Americans, 
Hispanics, and those with low levels of education.”192 There is a 
significant, positive correlation between financial literacy and 
retirement planning and performance.193 Financial illiteracy 
                                            
 185. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)–(2) (2006); Usha Rodrigues & Mike 
Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in Securities Disclosure Arbitrage, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 45 (2010) (discussing how information embedded in disclosures can be 
muddled and easy to ignore because of other information included in such 
disclosures). 
 186. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 405. 
The SAR must contain specific information: for defined contribution plans: 
financial statement for employee pension benefit plans; and the number of 
employees, name and address of each fiduciary, the name of and reason any 
person received compensation to perform services for the plan, and a reason 
for the change on any material plan advisor. 
Id. at 409. 
 187. Id. at 405. Recent forms focus on additional disclosures for participants. See 
Fact Sheet: Final Rule to Improve Transparency of Fees and Expenses to Workers in 
401(k)-Type Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsparticipantfeerule.html [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
For a more complete discussion of proposed disclosure reforms, see Part VI.B.2. 
 188. Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1824. 
 189. Id. at 1853–54. 
 190. See Gavin Clarkson, Wall Street Indians: Information Asymmetry and 
Barriers to Tribal Capital Market Access, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 943, 947 (2008) 
(“[I]nformation asymmetry exists when a party possesses greater informational 
awareness pertinent to effective participation in a given situation relative to other 
participating parties.”). 
 191. Lusardi, supra note 183, at 109 (describing “widespread” financial illiteracy). 
 192. Id. (citation omitted). 
 193. Medill, supra note 33, at 337–38. 
Numerous research studies have found that even when controlling for 
disparities in income levels, there is a strong positive correlation between the 
level of financial literacy and the amount of personal retirement savings. The 
causal link between the two centers on the planning process. Researchers 
hypothesize that greater financial literacy improves retirement savings because 
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threatens the success of individual retirement savings as well as 
the social safety net of retirement where our policies strive to 
facilitate comfortable retirements for an aging population. A 
criticism of the ERISA disclosure policies and practices is that 
they are “dishonest.”194 “A policy based on the providing of 
information to participants that is not provided, and on the 
assumption that participants will use this information on their 
own in ways that they can not, are essentially a fictitious 
construct.”195 
The ERISA framework is ill-equipped to address financial 
literacy deficiencies with few resources dedicated to participant 
education aimed at compensating for these shifting risks. Under 
ERISA, employer sponsors are not required to provide financial 
education or advice to participants.196 The Department of Labor 
(DOL) oversees any employer/employee education initiatives 
implemented.197 Employers must provide some additional 
information upon request, such as fee comparisons and charges 
that may reduce return rates.198 Despite these limitations, 
                                            
it counters psychological biases and improves the cognitive ability of individuals 
to collect and evaluate information concerning their options. Significantly, 
researchers have shown that improved financial literacy correlates with higher 
levels of retirement savings by all workers, not just those with high incomes. 
Id.; see also Lusardi, supra note 183, at 113–20 (discussing the correlation between 
financial planning behaviors and wealth accumulation). 
 194. Herbert A. Whitehouse, The Use of ERISA § 3(38) Investment Managers in 
Plans Offering Mutual Fund Investment Options to Participants § 1.07 (Apr. 15, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id= 1811085. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Medill, supra note 33, at 338 (“Employers are not required to provide investment 
educational materials to 401(k) plan participants, and many employers do not.”); see also 29 
C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(4) (2006) (“A fiduciary has no obligation under part four of Title I of the 
Act to provide investment advice to a participant or beneficiary under an ERISA section 404(c) 
plan.”); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)–(2) (noting that “there is no obligation to provide 
investment advice at any time” under section (c)(4)); Participant Directed Individual Account 
Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 49,906, 46,922 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). 
 197. In the 1997 Savings Are Vital to Everyone’s Retirement (SAVER) Act, Congress 
vested the Department of Labor (DOL) with the responsibility to encourage retirement 
financial education. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146–1447 (2000). Congress found that “far too many 
Americans—particularly the young—are either unaware of, or without the knowledge and 
resources necessary to take advantage of, the extensive benefits offered by our retirement 
savings system.” Savings Are Vital to Everyone’s Retirement (SAVER) Act of 1997, Pub. 
L. No. 105-92, § 2(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2139, 2139. To promote retirement savings through 
education, the DOL was tasked with creating an ongoing public education program. 29 
U.S.C. § 1146; SAVER Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-92, § 2(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2139, 2139. 
 198. Medill, supra note 33, at 345–46. 
Employers are not absolutely required to provide participants in their 401(k) 
plans with a comparative description of the investment management fees and 
other charges that may reduce the rate of return for each investment option 
available under the plans. Rather, an employer must provide this information 
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employer education is a common source of financial 
information,199 as is information from friends and families.200 The 
platform of employer-provided financial education is criticized as 
being ineffective or marginally effective (i.e., raising awareness 
but not changing behaviors) and geared towards those likely to 
already be engaged in some form of financial planning rather 
than overcoming fundamental knowledge gaps for participants.201 
The consequences of these information asymmetries are 
significant: without proper information participants charged 
with managing their retirement accounts make poor and too 
few choices. For example, many participants do not save 
enough and erode accumulated savings with early withdrawals 
or loans.202 Specifically, one in four American households make 
pre-retirement withdrawals for nonretirement spending 
                                            
only if a participant affirmatively requests the information. Furthermore, 
employers are not required to explain to participants how even a slightly higher 
investment management fee, compounded over time, can significantly reduce 
their account balances at retirement. 
Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1) (listing mandatory disclosure 
information that employers must divulge to plan participants); id. §§ 2550.404c-
1(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(i)–(ii) (describing the information the fiduciary must provide the 
beneficiary). 
 199. Medill, supra note 33, at 338 (“The most likely source of financial education is 
from an employer who sponsors a 401(k) plan.”). 
 200. Lusardi, supra note 183, at 134 (describing research establishing that default 
contribution rates in defined contribution plans are too low and lead to insufficient 
savings as well as a failure to capitalize upon employer matching programs and tax 
deferral savings); see also id. at 127–28 (citing family and friends as a primary source of 
financial information). 
 201. See Medill, supra note 33, at 338–39 (“When employers do provide such 
educational materials, the quality is uneven. Recent research also suggests that 
employer-provided educational materials are geared toward individuals who are natural 
‘planners’ and that these materials do not appeal to the approximately 50 percent of the 
working population that is not planning-oriented.”); see also Lusardi, supra note 183, at 
132 (“After attending the seminar, several participants stated they intended to change 
their retirement goals, and many revised their expected level of retirement 
income. . . . However, it was only a minority of participants who were affected by the 
seminars. Just 12 percent of seminar attendees reported changes in retirement-age goals 
and close to 30 percent reported changes in retirement-income goals. Moreover, their 
intentions did not always translate into actions. When interviewed several months later, 
many of those who had intended to make changes had not implemented them yet.”). 
 202. See Lusardi, supra note 183, at 134 (discussing low savings rates and low default 
contribution rates). The hidden problem with self-directed 401(k) plans is the lure to cash out 
retirement savings as needed or when the participant changes jobs rather than roll it over. 
MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 39. Another reason for underfunded defined contribution 
accounts is the role of fees. Id. at 76 (“[A] possible explanation for the lower return in defined 
contribution plans is investment fees, which typically account for 75–90 percent of total 
expenses associated with managing 401(k) plans. These fees (which compensate providers of, 
say, mutual funds for selecting the stocks and undertaking the research that leads to buy and 
sell decisions) are usually assessed as a percentage of invested assets and are paid by the 
employee through direct deductions from investment returns.”). 
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needs.203 Many participants do not adjust initial investment 
allocations or default allocations for a plan to account for 
increased salary, age, or retirement needs.204 Participants 
consistently make investment allocations based upon the past 
performance of funds despite extensive empirical evidence (and 
SEC disclosures) that past returns are not a guarantee or even a 
good predictor of future, positive returns.205 Additionally, if 
available, participants tend to overinvest in company stock as a 
part of an employee stock option plan due to familiarity, 
endorsement, and loyalty biases.206 
Behavioral economics provides some explanation for these 
results. In the absence of tools to make informed decisions, 
participants may rely upon biases and information heuristics to 
manage their retirement savings, including “procrastination 
(people delay saving, do not save, or do not save enough), inertia 
(people stay where they are), and immobilization (whereby 
conflicts and confusion lead people to behave passively, like a 
                                            
 203. Stephen Miller, Preretirement 401(k) Breaches on the Rise: Household Budgets and 
Emergency Funds Can Help Workers Avoid Raids on Their 401(k)s, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. 
MGMT. (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/Articles/Pages/ 
Preretirement-401k-Breaches.aspx. 
 204. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 91 (“[Forty-seven] percent of participants 
made no changes, and another 21 percent made only one change over the nine-year 
period. In terms of assets, 73 percent made no changes, and another 14 percent made only 
one change.”); see also id. at 90 (documenting that people do not change investment 
allocations based upon age or investment return); id. at 82–83 (describing failures to 
reallocate investment based upon returns and disrupting intended plan balances, which 
create an asset blend that is either too conservative or risky). 
 205. Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 147, at 430–35 (documenting the reliance 
of individuals on past performance in making investment allocation decisions and the 
evidence that dispels a relationship between past high returns and future positive 
performance). 
Capon, Fitzsimons, and Rice’s survey of households that invest in mutual funds 
found that a fund’s ‘investment performance track record’ was the most 
important factor in investors’ choice of funds. Also, a survey sponsored by the 
Investment Company Institute—the trade association of the mutual fund 
industry—found that 69 percent of fund investors reviewed a fund’s ‘historical 
performance’ before investing. 
Id. at 433 (footnotes omitted); see also Michael Finke & Shaun Pfeiffer, Performance Gap: 
The Impact of Broker Advice and Fund Valuation 2, 3 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.academyfinancial.org/10Conference/10Proceedings/(5B)%20Finke, 
%20Pfeiffer.pdf (describing recent research confirming that priority investors place on 
past returns rather than other more predictive fund features, such as fees and costs). 
 206. Congress did not extend the 10% limit on employer stock holdings that exists 
with defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans. Choi, Laibson & Madrian, supra 
note 119, at 155. As such, employer sponsors have flexibility with regard to how much 
company stock to offer in plans. Participant choices regarding company stock, however, 
may be subject to biases such as loyalty (feeling like they should invest in the company), 
endorsement (inclusive signals endorsement of the safety of the investment), and 
familiarity (in a world of unknown investments the informed decision to select the one you 
know). Id. at 157–58. 
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deer in the headlights).”207 Information asymmetries and 
inadequate tools to manage individual investment portfolios 
demonstrate the risk shift under self-directed defined 
contribution plans and may lead to insufficient savings and 
exposure to great risks. 
C. Longevity Risks 
Another factor that influences the success of retirement 
savings is the longevity risk, which asks how long retirees will 
live. Increasing life expectancy increases funding obligations.208 
The longevity risk assumed by defined contribution participants 
is that they live longer than expected and therefore spend their 
retirement money before they (or their spouse) die.209 
Depending on the payment option selected, under defined 
benefit plans retirees are paid a fixed amount until their death or 
the death of their spouse so that employers, not the individuals, 
bear the risk of longevity.210 Defined benefit plans thus offer an 
annuity-like payment system, which guarantees a constant sum 
of money over the remaining life of the participant and any 
designated beneficiaries.211 The longevity risk is exacerbated in 
the defined contribution context because retirement benefits 
are generally available as a lump sum upon reaching the 
minimum age of retirement.212 Once the retirement benefit is 
                                            
 207. Nicholas Barr & Peter Diamond, Reforming Pensions: Lessons from Economic 
Theory and Some Policy Directions, ECONOMIA, Spring 2011, at 1, 9 (2010). 
 208. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 458–62 (describing three types of pension benefit 
risks: investment risk, funding risk, and longevity risk); see also MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, 
supra note 6, at 47 (discussing longevity risks of defined contribution plans borne by 
retirees and the need to purchase annuities). 
 209. See Don Ezra, How Should Retirees Manage Investment and Longevity Risk in a 
Defined Contribution World?, ROTMAN INT’L J. PENSION MGMT., Fall 2011, at 3, 62, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1829342 (describing longevity risk of investments). 
 210. See Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 458, 462. 
 211. See id. at 462. 
The traditional, annuity-paying defined benefit plan provides at least partial 
protection against longevity risk because such a traditional pension disburses 
retirement payments periodically (typically monthly) and continues such 
annuity-type payments until the participant’s death—often with payments 
continuing at a reduced level to the surviving spouse. With such a lifetime 
annuity it is by definition impossible for the retiree to outlive her pension 
income, though that income may decline in real value if it is not increased to 
reflect increments in the cost of living. 
Id. 
 212. At retirement, each participant is entitled to receive the balance of his or her 
account. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-15. These lump-sum distributions of defined 
contribution plans generate significant challenges of managing and investing that money 
in light of potential stock market volatility, risks of high inflation/low interest rates, life 
expectancy, and health care costs. Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Lessons from 
Do Not Delete  9/22/2013 2:49 PM 
2013] RETIREMENT REVOLUTION 193 
paid out, the money is beyond the purview of ERISA 
oversight.213 Not only must the retiree make assumptions about 
life expectancy and therefore the anticipated amount needed 
for retirement, but the retiree must then either monitor 
distributions from the savings or individually purchase an 
annuity.214 While there are justifications for purchasing an 
annuity upon withdrawing assets from a defined contribution 
plan, it is neither required, nor is it a common practice.215 
Annuities are expensive to purchase individually and involve a 
loss of control over the invested assets that can be barriers to 
consumers’ purchase.216 The longevity risks increase, of course, 
with rising life expectancy and the rising cost of health care.217 
Longevity risks increase the burden on citizen shareholders 
and pose a threat to retirement financial security. 
In our defined contribution society, individuals are tasked 
with allocating and monitoring portfolios as well as 
understanding basic market and longevity risks. Shifting these 
burdens onto individuals pose obstacles for many—
                                            
Behavioral Finance for Retirement Plan Design, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE 3, 
26–30 (2004). Participants age 59½ or older can withdraw from qualified retirement 
accounts without incurring an early withdrawal penalty tax of 10%. Retirement Topics—
Tax on Early Distributions, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-
Employee/Retirement-Topics---Tax-on-Early-Distributions (last updated June 17, 2013). 
 213. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-14. 
 214. See Ezra, supra note 209, at 63 (describing an annuity as “the only way to take 
longevity risk out of the picture”). 
 215. See Barr & Diamond, supra note 207, at 3 (“Fluctuations in the cumulative 
return on assets during working life affect the individual account holder by affecting the 
amount available to finance retirement. If the worker buys an annuity, he or she will have 
faced the risk in the pricing of annuities, reflecting both mortality projections and asset 
returns from this point forward. Once the annuity is purchased, however, further 
fluctuations in asset returns and the development of mortality compared to the 
projections used in pricing the annuity are borne by the insurance company, unless 
annuity benefits are indexed for asset returns (a variable annuity) or for mortality 
realizations . . . . Annuitization shifts risks after retirement to insurers, but the retiree 
still faces the risk of the pricing of annuities at the start of retirement.”); see also 
MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 47 (“The only way that a 401(k) participant or a 
participant in a new hybrid plan can insure against outliving resources is to purchase an 
annuity, and the price of that annuity will largely depend on the interest rate at which 
the insurance company can invest its funds. . . . [T]he employer bears this risk.”). 
 216. See Ezra, supra note 209, at 65 (“[P]eople do not buy annuities voluntarily. They 
cite a feeling that in buying an annuity they have lost control of their assets.”); see also 
Margaret Collins, Income for Life? Sure, But What Does it Cost?, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, June 27–July 3, 2011, at 47, 47–48 (describing annuity protections as 
coming with high cost and many conditions that make comparing and selecting the 
appropriate annuity difficult for consumers). 
 217. See generally Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 4: The Financial 
Impact of Longevity Risk, IMF (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/01/pdf/c4.pdf (discussing the impact of life 
expectancy and health care on longevity risks and financial stability of governments, 
private companies and individuals). 
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disproportionately affecting women and minority investors.218 
Financial literacy deficits make shouldering these burdens 
onerous. Additionally, the ERISA framework is not equipped to 
address this deficit with minimal resources focused on 
voluntary education programs and ineffective participant 
disclosures.219 The gamble involved in the defined contribution 
society involves potential negative impact on individual and 
social financial stability. 
V. DILUTED ERISA FIDUCIARY STANDARDS FOR CITIZEN 
SHAREHOLDERS 
ERISA, which was premised on strong fiduciary duties 
and oversight of employers and other designated actors in the 
defined benefit context, relaxed, if not eliminated, many of 
those protections for self-directed defined contribution 
participants.220 As a result, the traditional protections 
associated with retirement benefits are largely absent for the 
citizen shareholder in a defined contribution plan.221 
Sponsors and trustees of self-directed defined contribution 
plans are subject to fiduciary duties that are diluted in scope and 
diffused among various actors, reducing accountability 
mechanisms and liability.222 For example, in self-directed 
accounts where participants make investment choices, the 
“choice” creates a safe harbor presumption for the employer and 
other fiduciaries shielding them against liability.223 The safe 
harbor presumption, not present for defined benefit plans, is a 
barrier to recovery for investors and illustrates the diluted 
ERISA protections for citizen shareholders.224 This Part discusses 
                                            
 218. Lusardi, supra note 183, at 124 (“Financial illiteracy is particularly acute among the 
elderly, African-Americans, Hispanics, women, and those with low education levels . . . .”). 
 219. See supra notes 194–201 and accompanying text (discussing financial education and 
disclosures). 
 220. Muir, supra note 46, at 393–94 (“[ERISA] incorporates, both explicitly and implicitly, 
a broad range of fiduciary principles to protect people who participate in and benefit from 
private sector employee benefit plans.” (citations omitted)). 
 221. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (describing protections for citizen 
shareholders). 
 222. Muir, supra note 46, at 395 (“Unlike traditional trust law, in which each 
fiduciary is responsible for all fiduciary obligations owed to the trust, ERISA’s functional 
definition of ‘fiduciary’ results in many fiduciaries, each with limited responsibilities.”). 
 223. ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006). 
 224. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(i) (2012) (“If a participant or beneficiary of an 
ERISA section 404(c) plan exercises independent control over assets in his individual 
account in the manner described in paragraph (c), then no other person who is a fiduciary 
with respect to such plan shall be liable for any loss, or with respect to any breach of part 
4 of title I of the Act, that is the direct and necessary result of that participant’s or 
beneficiary’s exercise of control.”); see also DiFelice v. US Airways, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 
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the fiduciary standards imposed by ERISA, the classification of 
fiduciaries, and exceptions to liability, and it examines certain 
fee and stock drop cases. This Part also discusses specific defined 
contribution causes of action that seek liability despite the “safe 
harbor” because certain structural plan decisions, such as 
investment options, fees, and plan disclosures, greatly impact 
defined contribution plan outcomes for individual participants 
and thus warrant accountability to participants. 
A. ERISA Fiduciary Duties 
ERISA imposes duties on fiduciaries who govern both 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans, although, as 
discussed below, those duties are diluted with regard to self-
directed defined contribution plans.225 For a plaintiff to 
successfully raise a fiduciary duty claim, the action in question 
must be taken by a fiduciary, and it must have violated one of the 
enumerated fiduciary duties under ERISA.226 If an actor manages 
plan assets, renders investment advice, or is vested with 
discretionary authority over the plan and is therefore a fiduciary, 
such an actor must act (1) “solely in the interest of the plan’s 
participants and beneficiaries,” (2) for the exclusive purpose of 
“defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan,” 
(3) “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence of a prudent 
[person] in similar [situations],” (4) consistent with 
diversification principles, (5) in accordance with plan documents, 
and (6) without conflicts of interest or self-dealing.227 
ERISA fiduciaries are held to standards described as “the 
highest known to the law.”228 Fiduciaries under ERISA have, in 
name at least, strong,229 “twin” fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
                                            
758, 775 (E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that the fiduciary was shielded from liability “even 
when the fiduciary arguably may have breached its duties”). 
 225. See infra Part V (discussing the dilution of fiduciary duties in defined 
contribution plans). 
 226. ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109. 
 227. ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a); KOZAK, supra note 4, at 349–50, 355–57; 
see also Borzi, supra note 4, at A-24; Maher & Stris, supra note 88, at 458 (“In virtually 
all defined contribution pension plans, promisees rely on plan fiduciaries to perform 
functions that are too difficult or costly for promisees to perform on their own. While some 
fiduciary obligations, such as the restrictions on ‘prohibited transactions,’ have been 
expressed in sets of fairly clear rules, the core aspects of fiduciary duties under ERISA are 
expressed and applied as standards—such as the duty to act ‘solely in the interest of 
beneficiaries’ and the duty to prudently administer the plan.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 228. Dudenhoefer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F.3d 410, 417 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pfeil v. State St. Bank & Trust, 671 F.3d 585, 591 (6th 
Cir. 2012)). 
 229. “Congress intended that private individuals would play an important role in 
enforcing ERISA’s fiduciary duties—duties which have been described as ‘the highest 
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prudence.230 The loyalty obligation, established under section 
404(a), requires that fiduciaries act “solely in the interest of 
[plan] participants and beneficiaries . . . . for the exclusive 
purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their 
beneficiaries.”231 Fiduciaries must also act to defray the 
“reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”232 Fiduciaries 
may not, without violating the fiduciary duty of loyalty, act in 
favor of a personal benefit or to the benefit of a third party.233 
“[M]ost courts have treated the ‘solely in the interest’ and 
‘exclusive purpose’ standards interchangeably as codifications 
of the trust law duty of undivided loyalty.”234 
Fiduciaries observe the second pillar, the duty of 
prudence, by executing plan functions “with the care, skill, 
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and 
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”235 The 
prudence obligation is an “objective” standard and judicial 
inquiries focus on the process undertaken by the fiduciary, not 
necessarily the end result.236 A fiduciary must “(1) . . . employ 
proper methods to investigate, evaluate and structure the 
investment; (2) . . . act in a manner as would others who have 
a capacity and familiarity with such matters; and (3) . . . 
exercise independent judgment when making investment 
decisions.”237 DOL regulations further clarify the prudence 
                                            
known to the law.’” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 
2009) (citing Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
 230. Id. at 595 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)). 
 231. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
 232. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 233. Robert N. Eccles et al., Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA 21–22 (Dec. 1, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.asppa.org/Document-
Vault/Docs/Conferences/Los%20Angeles%20Benefits%20Conference/2011/ws9.aspx; 
see also Chao v. Malkani, 452 F.3d 290, 291, 298–99 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
fiduciaries breached their duties of loyalty by raiding plan assets); Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. Solmsen, 671 F. Supp. 938, 945–46 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (using plan assets 
for corporate purposes violates a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty). 
 234. Eccles et al., supra note 233, at 21; see also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 
457 (10th Cir. 1978) (treating the standards interchangeably when considering 
whether the fiduciary’s responsibilities under ERISA section 404(a)(1) were met). 
 235. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
 236. “The statute’s ‘prudent person standard is an objective standard . . . that 
focuses on the fiduciary’s conduct preceding the challenged decision.’ In evaluating 
whether a fiduciary has acted prudently, we therefore focus on the process by which 
it makes its decisions rather than the results of those decisions.” Braden v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 595 (8th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 
 237. In re State St. Bank & Trust Fixed Income Funds Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 
614, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting United States v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council of 
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standard by requiring fiduciaries to give “appropriate 
consideration” to facts relevant to the investment and the 
plan’s portfolio.238 With defined contribution plans, the 
prudence standard applies primarily to the selection of 
investments and administration of the plan, rather than the 
performance of individually invested assets.239 In addition to 
these twin duties, fiduciaries responsible for governing any 
qualified plan have a duty to diversify assets and follow plan 
documents.240 The diversification obligation imposes duties on 
fiduciaries to “minimize the risk of large losses”241 consistent 
with a modern portfolio investment approach of asset 
diversification.242 The duty to diversify under ERISA “prohibits 
a fiduciary from investing disproportionately in a particular 
investment or enterprise.”243 Rather than establishing a 
percentage, diversification requirements are based upon the 
consideration of factors such as purpose of the plan, amount of 
the plan assets, financial conditions, investment type, 
distribution among industries, and maturity dates.244 Diversity is 
evaluated within each investment option or, when there are 
several managers/investment types within a single plan, the 
                                            
Greater N.Y., 90 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D.N.Y 1995)). 
 238. 29 C.F.R. § 2250.404a-1(b)(1) (2012). Appropriate consideration includes: 
(i) a determination by the fiduciary that the particular investment or investment 
course of action is reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio (or, where 
applicable, that portion of the plan portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary 
has investment duties), to further the purposes of the plan, taking into 
consideration the risk of loss and the opportunities for gain (or other return) 
associated with the investment or investment course of action, and 
(ii) Consideration of the following facts as they relate to such [portion of the 
portfolio: 
(A) The composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification; 
(B) The liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated 
cash flow requirements of the plan; and 
(C) The projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan. 
Id. § 2550.404a-1(b)(2). 
 239. Emily Adams, Protecting America’s Financial Future: Why Courts Should Enforce 
ERISA’s Duties of Prudence and Disclosure, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 345, 349–50 (2011). 
 240. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)–(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)–(D). 
 241. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).  
 242. Id.; see also KOZAK, supra note 4, at 356 (“Courts have recently held 
that . . . investment diversification should adopt modern portfolio theory.”). For a discussion of 
modern portfolio theory, see MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 79, which describes the 
portfolios as efficient because “it is not possible to achieve a higher return without taking on 
additional risk.” 
 243. In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 438 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 244. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5038, 5084–85; see also In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 438 (listing factors to be considered when 
measuring ERISA’s duty to diversify). 
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portion of the plan accountable to each fiduciary.245 For example, 
in a plan offering mutual fund investments, money market 
savings, and bonds, diversification for each of the three types of 
investments would be evaluated individually rather than 
examining the composite diversification among the three 
investment types.246 If a plaintiff establishes a failure to diversify, 
the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the 
lack of diversification was prudent.247 The diversification duty is 
modified when company stock, in the form of an ESOP, is offered 
as an investment option within a plan.248 
B. ERISA Fiduciary Status 
Who owes the fiduciary duties described above? ERISA 
imposes fiduciary duties on plan fiduciaries like the sponsoring 
employer and any entity named in the plan documents, 
appointed by the board, or performing “fiduciary functions” for 
the plan.249 Determining fiduciary status under ERISA is a 
factually and legally complex endeavor, often a primary focus of 
litigation.250 The third category of “functional fiduciary” is 
frequently a crucial component of litigation regarding defined 
contribution plans in which a host of actors beyond the employer 
and designated trustees make structural plan decisions 
regarding investment options, plan administration, plan fees, 
and plan disclosures.251 For example, within a self-directed 
                                            
 245. In re State St. Bank & Trust Fixed Income Funds Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 614, 
650–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 438–40). Diversification is 
measured with respect to the plan assets in question, not with respect to all of the 
investments within a plan. See GIW Indus., Inc. v. Trevor, Steward, Burton & Jacobsen, 
Inc., 895 F.2d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting evaluating diversification of the entire 
plan rather than the plan assets in question); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280 (indicating that 
investments within different types of vehicles such as equities or bonds must be 
diversified). 
 246. In re State St. Bank, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 650–51. 
 247. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280; see also In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 438. 
 248. Publicly traded companies may offer company stock as an investment option in 
their 401(k) plans. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B)–(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2006); 29 CFR 
§ 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(ii)(E)(4) (2012). Company stock is often offered as a part of an 
employee stock ownership plan, also known as an ESOP. “[E]mployer stock regulations 
for 401(k) plans with an ESOP differ from those for plans without one.” Choi, Laibson & 
Madrian, supra note 119, at 155. For a general discussion of ESOPs and a summary of the 
unique standards of review associated with them, see Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 
F.3d 1267, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012) (describing ESOP standards of review and compliance 
duties); see also Jara, supra note 119, at 547–48 (discussing ESOP plans). 
 249. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 250. “The determination of an individual’s fiduciary status is an inherently factual 
inquiry and will require analysis of the specific facts and circumstances of each case.” 
KOZAK, supra note 4, at 350. 
 251. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231 (2000) (holding that eligibility 
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defined contribution plan, in addition to the sponsoring employer, 
its corporate board, and named fiduciaries or trustee in the plan 
documents, there are often also investment advisors who help 
populate the plans, investment brokers who administer the 
buying and selling of plan assets, administrative/record-keeping 
third parties, and then the intermediary managers who manage 
participant contributions invested in participating mutual or 
index funds.252 Each of these actors impacts individual 
performance of retirement accounts, but most are not ERISA 
fiduciaries.253 The result is both weakened fiduciary duties and a 
narrow scope of who is a fiduciary in the context of self-directed 
defined contribution plans, despite a wide range of actors who 
influence the structure and administration of the plan. 
Determining ERISA fiduciary status requires both a 
statutory and a functional analysis. The documentation for each 
plan must identify a named fiduciary, who has general fiduciary 
responsibility for the entire plan and therefore is a statutory 
fiduciary.254 Additionally, to the extent that any person or entity 
(i) exercises discretionary authority or control over the 
management or payment of assets, (ii) gives investment advice 
regarding plan assets for any compensation,255 or (iii) has any 
discretionary authority over plan administration, he or she is 
acting as a “functional” fiduciary of the plan.256 In applying this 
standard, DOL regulations establish that certain positions, such 
as a plan trustee or plan administrator, are “fiduciary” by the 
nature of the role performed.257 All other determinations depend 
upon the nature of the function performed, not just the status or 
title of the person or entity acting.258 
                                            
decisions by the employer are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). 
 255. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263-02 (proposed Oct. 22, 
2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510) available at 
http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/HtmlDisplay.aspx?DocId=24328&AgencyId=8&Do
cumentType=1. 
 256. See Muir, supra note 46, at 395 (explaining that an individual becomes an 
ERISA fiduciary when they exercise discretion over the assets, management, or 
administration of the plan or they provide investment advice for compensation). 
 257. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (2012). 
 258. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993); Beddall v. State St. Bank 
& Trust, 137 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The statute also extends fiduciary liability to 
functional fiduciaries.”); Acosta v. Pac. Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A 
person’s actions, not the official designation of his role, determine whether he enjoys 
fiduciary status.”); Deborah S. Davidson & Simon J. Torres, Fiduciary Responsibility 
Under ERISA, in 1 ABA 25TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ERISA BASICS, at B-19 
(2011). 
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The control standard is a high threshold to meet, and 
mere participation in a plan will not satisfy it for purposes of 
attaching fiduciary standards.259 For example, a broker 
administering a self-directed defined contribution plan would 
not incur liability for those functions unless the broker had 
control over the plan assets or provided advice to plan 
participants.260 In Hecker v. Deere Co., the plaintiffs alleged 
that Fidelity Trust, the broker for the defined contribution 
plan, “played a role in” selecting the list of funds included in 
the plan from which participants had to invest.261 The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ complaint, distinguishing control that would give 
rise to liability from merely “play[ing] a role” in plan fund 
selections.262 The defined contribution plan in Hecker contained 
twenty “primary” mutual funds in the plan as well as a 
brokerage window option that granted investors access to a 
broader range of securities—2,500 investments traded on 
public indices.263 By assisting in selecting the twenty “primary” 
funds, the broker did not exercise control sufficient to establish 
fiduciary status and attach corresponding fiduciary duties.264 
Additionally, ERISA fiduciary standards only apply to the 
extent that an actor is engaged in a fiduciary function.265 For 
example, courts applying ERISA case law recognize that 
employers and other actors can wear “two hats” and only be 
exposed to liability when performing a plan fiduciary 
function.266 This is particularly applicable to employers who 
                                            
 259. Beddall, 137 F.3d at 17–18 (affirming the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint 
because the Bank retained no discretionary authority over the plan’s real estate 
investments). 
 260. See Kerns v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 214, 217–18 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(“Persons who provide professional services to plan administrators ‘are not ERISA 
fiduciaries unless they transcend the normal role’ and exercise discretionary authority.” 
(quoting Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669 (8th Cir. 1992))). 
 261. “Each plan participant decided for herself where to put her 401(k) dollars; the 
only limitation was that the investment vehicle had to be one offered by the Plan. Each 
fund included within the Plans charged a fee, calculated as a percentage of assets the 
investor placed with it.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 262. “There is an important difference between an assertion that a firm exercised 
‘final authority’ over the choice of funds, on the one hand, and an assertion that a firm 
simply ‘played a role’ in the process, on the other hand.” Id. at 584. 
 263. Id. at 581. 
 264. Id. at 583–84. 
 265. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006); see also Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust, 137 
F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[F]iduciary status is not an all or nothing proposition; the 
statutory language indicates that a person is a plan fiduciary only ‘to the extent’ that he 
possesses or exercises the requisite discretion or control.”). 
 266. The “two hats” doctrine provides that when an individual is acting in a 
corporate capacity on behalf of the company, ERISA’s fiduciary duties are not implicated. 
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engage in many activities that are outside of the scope of the 
ERISA framework.267 Additionally, ERISA contains specific 
disclaimers of fiduciary responsibility with regard to what are 
called “settlor” functions of a plan.268 Settlor functions include 
“establishing, funding, amending, and terminating” the benefit 
plan.269 In this regard, the fiduciary standard only attaches to a 
fiduciary actor when it is engaged in a fiduciary function such as 
managing plan assets, giving investment advice, or exercising 
discretion over the plan.270 Although a fiduciary can wear two 
hats, it must wear only one at a time and it always wears the 
“fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions.”271 
ERISA establishes a complex and seemingly comprehensive 
framework of protections for participants with both named and 
functional fiduciaries and duties that range from broad concepts 
such as loyalty and prudence to specific duties regarding 
disclosures, fees, and diversification obligations.272 This 
                                            
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225–26 (2000) (noting that the employer can switch 
between wearing its “fiduciary” and “employer” hats); see also Holdeman v. Devine, 474 
F.3d 770, 778 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that an employer can wear two hats as a 
fiduciary and a non-fiduciary employer). 
 267. Some ERISA-related actions are not fiduciary functions. Those actions, called 
settlor functions, include “establishing, designing, amending or terminating an ERISA 
plan” as those decisions relate to the voluntary nature of pension benefits rather than 
administering them once promised. See, e.g., Davidson & Torres, supra note 258, at B-21. 
“The critical distinction for purposes of fiduciary obligation, and ultimately for liability, 
lies in the line drawn between implementation actions, such as the misrepresentations 
made by Varity, and settlor actions, such as the participant transfers made by B.F. 
Goodrich or the benefit amendments made by Hughes Aircraft.” Muir, supra note 46, at 
431. 
 268. See C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-2 (2012) (asserting that a person is a fiduciary only if they 
perform one or more of the functions described in section 3(21)(A) of ERISA with respect to an 
employee benefit plan). Common ministerial functions include applying eligibility rules, 
calculating services, preparing employee communications, maintaining employee service 
records, preparing reports required by the federal government such as form 5550, calculating 
benefits, orienting new participants, collecting contributions, preparing participant benefit 
reports, processing claims, and making third-party recommendations regarding plan 
administration. Davidson & Torres, supra note 258, at B-34 to B-35. 
 269. Adams v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., 199 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 718 (6th Cir. 2000)); see also Ames v. Am. Nat’l Can 
Co., 170 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen company representatives . . . are not acting in 
their capacity as a plan fiduciary . . . they do not bear the legal obligations that go along with 
fiduciary status.”). 
 270. “[D]espite whatever harm counterclaim defendants may have done to ULLICO, they 
cannot, as a matter of law, be liable under ERISA’s fiduciary provisions for decisions they 
made as corporate officers.” In re Ullico Inc. Litig., 605 F. Supp. 2d 210, 220 (D.D.C. 2009). 
When an employer acts in its corporate capacity, not as a fiduciary, it is performing what is 
called settlor functions. See, e.g., Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101 (2007) (“It is well 
established . . . that an employer’s decision whether to terminate an ERISA plan is a settlor 
function immune from ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.”). 
 271. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000). 
 272. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006). 
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framework is eroded in the context of self-directed defined 
contribution plans, and the protections offered to citizen 
shareholders are substantially weakened. 
C. Fiduciary Duty Liability and Exceptions 
ERISA section 409 establishes personal liability for any 
fiduciary breaching “any responsibilities, obligations, or duties 
imposed upon fiduciaries by [ERISA].”273 Section 502(a) of 
ERISA creates a private right of action for plan losses and 
enumerates the civil actions that investors may bring against 
fiduciaries for a breach of fiduciary duty.274 In LaRue v. 
DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed that defined contribution participants have a cause of 
action against plan fiduciaries “whose alleged misconduct 
impaired the value of plan assets in the participant’s 
individual account.”275 Importantly, LaRue established that 
participants could seek recovery for losses suffered to their 
individual accounts that were a part of defined contribution 
plan assets, distinguishing it from precedent that prohibited 
individual relief, such as consequential damages for delayed 
payment of benefits.276 
                                            
 273. Id. § 1109(a). 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the 
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall 
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting 
from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary 
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and 
shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary . . . . 
Id. 
 274. Id. § 1132. Section 502 also vests the Secretary of Labor as well as plan 
participants and beneficiaries with the right to bring actions on behalf of the plan for 
obligations defined in section 409(a). ERISA and securities cases may overlap. Securities 
fraud (or any derivative claim) cases are typically combined in a consolidated proceeding 
of multi-district litigation (MDL) before one judge. Clovis Trevino Bravo, ERISA 
Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims: Securities Litigation Under the Guise of 
ERISA?, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 497, 527 (2009). Under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), a mandatory stay of discovery is imposed pending a 
ruling on a motion to dismiss. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006). Because these cases are 
coordinated with ERISA-based claims where there is no such stay, an exception is made 
for ERISA-unique discovery. See, e.g., Robert Rachal et al., ERISA Fiduciary Duties 
Regarding 401(k) & ESOP Investments in Employer Stock, in 2 ABA 25TH ANNUAL 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ERISA BASICS, at M-14 (2011) (discussing PSLRA stays in 
conjunction with ERISA-based discovery). Coordinating the procedure of such combined 
cases raises complex issues beyond the scope of this Article. For a thorough discussion of 
such issues, see Bravo, supra, at 527 (describing the procedural and substantive 
requirements of lawsuits actionable under ERISA and securities law). 
 275. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 250 (2008). 
 276. Id. at 256; Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985). 
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1. Exceptions: Safe Harbors and Discretionary Deference. 
Because of clarification by LaRue that ERISA private rights of 
action extend to defined contribution participants, ERISA 
appears to provide rigorous protections for all investors.277 Two 
exemptions, however, substantially erode those protections. 
The first is the safe harbor for self-directed accounts briefly 
discussed above.278 The second is judicial deference to 
discretion in decision-making.279 
Self-directed accounts, like those in a 401(k), eliminate the 
need for an employer or other designated third-party to 
perform many benefit activities that would be considered 
fiduciary functions under a defined benefit plan, such as 
investment allocation, funding, and future payments, because 
those functions are shifted to the citizen shareholders to 
perform.280 As a result, section 404(c) of ERISA establishes for 
fiduciaries an affirmative defense against plan losses if 
participants exercised control over their accounts in making 
investment allocations.281 This affirmative defense, referred to 
as the safe harbor,282 shields a fiduciary from liability “even 
when the fiduciary arguably may have breached its duties.”283 
The limited scope of fiduciary liability for self-directed 
accounts contributed to the rise of the defined contribution 
society and also highlights a limitation of ERISA in protecting 
individual retirement benefits.284 
                                            
 277. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 256. 
 278. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text. 
 279. Discretion, a factor crucial in determining fiduciary status, is also a key factor is 
determining deference, and therefore a significant limitation to finding liability for violated 
fiduciary standards. Muir, supra note 46, at 410. 
 280.  
For defined contribution plans that do not offer the option of investment self-
direction, the promisor’s fiduciary role is obvious and enormous: the fiduciary is 
actively deciding how to invest assets beneficially owned by the plan participant. But 
even for plans that do offer self-directed accounts (and with respect to promisees who 
exercise that option), residual fiduciary duties remain. 
Maher & Stris, supra note 88, at 458 n.124. 
 281. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006). 
 282.  
If a participant or beneficiary of an ERISA section 404(c) plan exercises independent 
control over assets in his individual account in the manner described in paragraph 
(c), then no other person who is a fiduciary with respect to such plan shall be liable 
for any loss, or with respect to any breach of part 4 of title I of the Act, that is the 
direct and necessary result of that participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control. 
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(i) (2012). 
 283. DiFelice v. US Airways, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 758, 775 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 284. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (limiting fiduciary liability when a participant 
exercises independent control of individual account assets); see also Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 
F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]o the extent participants incurred excessive expenses, those 
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To qualify for the affirmative defense provided in section 
404(c), fiduciaries must establish three elements: (1) the plan at 
issue offers an individual account over which the participant 
exercised control, (2) participants must have actually exercised 
control as authorized under the plan, and (3) the loss or the breach 
must be the “result of a participant’s exercise of control.”285 The first 
two elements—available control and exercised control—are fairly 
straightforward tests established by ERISA and supporting DOL 
regulations.286 In addition to establishing participant control, 
fiduciaries must establish that the plan included “a sufficient 
range of options so that the participants have control over the 
risk of loss.”287 A sufficient range of options, which means a 
choice of at least three investment options, is necessary 
because it facilitates participants’ control over return and risk 
potential and creates an ability to diversify holdings.288 
Participants in self-directed defined contribution plans 
make final investment allocation decisions, which give rise to 
the safe harbor protections, but there are a myriad of decisions 
made by employers, trustees, named fiduciaries, investment 
advisors, brokers, and employer pension committees to select 
and monitor investment options available in a plan, the fees 
charged, and the information disseminated to participants.289 
“In virtually all defined contribution pension plans, promisees 
rely on plan fiduciaries to perform functions that are too 
difficult or costly for promisees to perform on their own.”290 I 
                                            
losses were the result of participants exercising control over their investments within the 
meaning of the safe harbor provision.”). 
 285. DiFelice, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 775–76. 
 286. Individual accounts under ERISA are defined in ERISA section 3(34). 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(34). DOL regulations establish a test for determining control if the 
participant is allowed to: 
(1) Choose from a broad range of investment alternatives . . . each of which 
has materially different risk and return characteristics; 
(2) give investment instructions with a frequency appropriate in light of the 
volatility of the investment alternatives . . . ; 
(3) diversify investments within and among in investment alternatives; and 
(4) obtain sufficient information to make informed investment decisions with 
respect to investment alternatives available under the plan. 
Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans (ERISA 
Section 404(c) Plans), 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1992). 
 287. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 589. 
 288. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c–1(b)(3)(i)(A)–(C) (2012) (defining a “broad range of 
investment alternatives”). 
 289. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A); see also In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 683 
F. Supp. 2d 294, 298–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that corporate directors who had not 
been named fiduciaries by the plan did not act as fiduciaries when making administrative 
plan decision such as appointing the plan committee). 
 290. Maher & Stris, supra note 88, at 458. 
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refer to these preparticipant investment decisions as 
structural plan decisions. The safe harbor is an affirmative 
defense to many, but not all, liabilities regarding these 
structural plan decisions.291 
Many structural plan decisions require discretionary 
decision-making. Courts give fiduciaries’ discretionary 
decision-making deference and only find fault if such actions 
are arbitrary and capricious—a high standard.292 “Where [an] 
ERISA plan administrator has ‘discretion,’ i.e., applies his own 
judgment in making plan decisions, court[s] review[] benefits 
decisions under arbitrary and capricious standard, which is 
substantively the same as abuse of discretion standard.”293 A 
fiduciary’s actions will be overturned only if they were taken 
in bad faith, lacked “factual foundation,” or were not 
supported by substantial evidence.294 The high standard of 
review is intended to limit excessive judicial intervention so 
that courts may not substitute their own interpretations of 
plan provisions for a rational interpretation offered by the 
plan’s fiduciaries.295 
The safe harbor and discretionary deference create incentives 
for employer sponsors to (1) provide or convert existing pension 
benefits into a self-directed defined contribution model where 
employees perform functions that would otherwise give rise to 
fiduciary liability; and (2) grant “discretionary authority” to named 
fiduciaries or delegated/designated parties in the plan document 
which ensures deferential review.296 Additionally, because 
                                            
 291. Id. at 458 n.124. 
 292.  
As explained above, one of the determinative factors of ERISA fiduciary status is the 
presence of discretion in decisionmaking [sic]. Ironically, although the presence of 
discretion may mean that a plan actor is a fiduciary, that same discretion often 
protects a fiduciary’s decisions from serious scrutiny. The relevant jurisprudence has 
established that, when a plan document reserves discretion to a fiduciary decision 
maker, the fiduciary’s decisions will be reversed only if they are found to be arbitrary 
and capricious. Even the decisions of a self-interested fiduciary frequently receive 
some level of deference. 
Muir, supra note 46, at 410. 
 293. Laura Dietz et al., Plan Administration: Standards of Care for Fiduciaries: Arbitrary 
and Capricious Standard of Review, 60A AM. JUR. 2D PENSIONS § 439 (2012) (citing Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)); see also 
Lipsey v. Union Underwear Pension Plan, 146 F. App’x 326, 330 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
the employer’s determination of plan eligibility was not arbitrary and capricious). 
 294. Dietz et al., supra note 293, § 439. 
 295. Cook v. Pension Plan for Salaried Emps. of Cyclops Corp., 801 F.2d 865, 869–71 (6th 
Cir. 1986); Offutt v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 735 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 296.  
Nonetheless, in a regrettable and unnecessary detour, the Court declared that 
deferential review would be required where the plan ‘gives the administrator or 
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fiduciaries are often tasked with determining the scope of the plans’ 
obligations and needs, once such a decision is made, it is then 
protected from rigorous judicial review, which in turn creates an 
incentive for drafting vague and ambiguous plan documents to 
facilitate as much deferential discretion as possible.297 The combined 
effect of the safe harbor resulting from self-directed accounts and 
the judicial deference afforded to discretionary decisions 
significantly erodes ERISA protections for citizen shareholders. 
2. Defined Contribution Liability in Practice. Participants 
in self-directed defined contribution plans bring several types of 
fiduciary duty cases such as nondisclosure of required plan 
documents, misrepresentation of material facts or plan changes, 
excessive fees, conflicts of interest, failure of diversification, and 
stock drop cases.298 These claims, however, are rarely successful 
because of the safe harbor and deferential review procedural 
barriers discussed above.299 The result is harsh and is crucial in 
understanding the limited oversight afforded defined 
contribution plans. This observation is not a critique of the 
absence of employer liability per se, but instead seeks to 
highlight the liability discrepancy between defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans and the resulting decreased oversight. 
                                            
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe 
the terms of the plan.’ The only limit the Firestone Court announced on deferential 
review was that a reviewing court must consider a fiduciary’s actual conflict of 
interest as “a ‘facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.”’ In 
other words: plans could simply write discretionary authority—and thus deferential 
review—into the plan document, and even in the presence of a conflict of interest, 
courts must use an abuse-of-discretion review, modified in some unspecified way by 
the presence of the conflict. 
Maher & Stris, supra note 88, at 471–72 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). 
 297.  
[T]he fiduciary has the right to determine the existence and scope of the plan’s 
obligations to participants and beneficiaries. Once made, the fiduciary’s 
determination will be reviewed by the courts only for abuse of discretion. The 
incentives are such that this combination of power to interpret and protection 
from serious scrutiny might be expected to encourage the drafting of ambiguous 
plan documents and the avoidance of specificity in benefit obligations. 
Muir, supra note 46, at 413. 
 298. See, e.g., Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(involving a claim relating to a company having invested nearly all of the plan’s funds in 
itself, and finding the company failed to act prudently following a drop in the stock price 
causing the plan’s assets to decrease); Adams, supra note 239, at 351–53 (discussing 
claims brought due to nondisclosure of plan documents, misrepresentation of material 
facts or plan changes, and excessive fees and revenue sharing). 
 299. See Charles C. Jackson et al., Who May Sue You and Why: How to Reduce Your 
ERISA Risks, and the Role of Fiduciary Liability Insurance, CHUBB 12–14 (June 2010), 
http://www.chubb.com/businesses/csi/chubb12107.pdf; supra notes 278–79 and 
accompanying text. 
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Defined benefit participants have a wider safety net of 
protections and accountability mechanisms, including fiduciary 
liability. 
Disputes over defined contribution plan fees and expenses, 
the focus of this Subpart, are a common form of recent litigation 
and raise both duty of disclosure and duty of prudence issues.300 
Fiduciaries have an obligation to administer plan duties with 
reasonable fees and must attempt to defray unnecessary fees as a 
part of their prudence obligation.301 The essence of fee litigation 
cases is that “the [plan] fiduciaries had an obligation to avoid 
higher than necessary fees in the mutual fund options offered in 
a plan menu, and failed to do so.”302 For the most part, 
administrative fees associated with self-directed defined 
contribution plans303 are borne by plan participants, one of the 
many shifts from employer to employee responsibility that 
occurs in our defined contribution society.304 Fee litigation 
                                            
 300. Adams, supra note 239, at 353 (“Confusion about the extent of the duty of 
disclosure and the role of the duty of prudence manifests itself in excessive fee and 
revenue-sharing cases.”). 
 301. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 302. Stephen D. Rosenberg, Retreat from the High Water Mark: Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty Claims Involving Excessive Fees After Tibble v. Edison International, J. PENSION 
BENEFITS, Spring 2011, at 12, 13. 
 303. Fees and expenses include one-time load fees such as front-end (a 
percentage deduction at the time of purchase) and back-end fees (a percentage 
deduction at the time of withdrawal) that essentially act as a transaction 
commission. Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, SEC (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mffees.htm (describing common fees and expenses 
charged with mutual fund investments). The second category is annual expenses, also 
called expense ratios, which are 12b-1 fees and management fees paid to investment 
advisors for overseeing the fund’s portfolio. Id. 12b-1 fees include distribution fees 
and shareholder service expenses. “‘Distribution fees’ include fees paid for marketing 
and selling fund shares, such as compensating brokers and others who sell fund 
shares, and paying for advertising, the printing and mailing of prospectuses to new 
investors, and the printing and mailing of sales literature.” Id. Shareholder services 
expenses include “fees paid to persons to respond to investor inquiries and provide 
investors with information about their investments.” Id.; see also MUNNELL & 
SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 77 (describing 12b-1 fees as “annual fees paid out of fund 
assets to cover commissions to salespersons and brokers, advertising costs, and other 
services” ranging between “0.25 percent and 1.0 percent of assets”). 
 304. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion Guidance: Guidance on Settlor v. Plan Expenses, 
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/AOs/settlor_guidance.html (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion Guidance] (responding to questions 
concerning the extent that plans may pay expenses that could be viewed as 
conferring a benefit on the plan sponsor). 
Employers sometimes confuse plan-related business expenses—which aren’t 
payable from plan assets—with plan administration expenses. The U.S. 
Department of Labor (DOL) has long held that costs incurred to design, 
establish, and terminate plans—so-called ‘settlor functions’—are not 
reasonable expenses of administering a plan. These expenses are incurred 
for the benefit of the employer and involve services the employer can 
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cases highlight the limitation of participant choice and how the 
plan structure, established by the employer and other 
fiduciaries, significantly impacts plan performance.305 The fee 
litigation cases illustrate the substantive limits of fiduciary 
duties as applied to citizen shareholders, who are precluded 
from protection on decisions that substantially impact 
participants’ choice and individual savings.306 
Plan fees and expenses are a crucial element of any plan 
and have great impact on plan performance because high fees 
diminish plan savings and earnings over time.307 The 
relationship between fees/expenses and fund performance is 
the basis of such claims—that a failure to reduce fees and 
expenses substantially impacts the accumulated retirement 
savings available to participants.308 Under the terms of the 
self-directed defined contribution plan, participants have 
control over the allocation of their accounts to various 
investment options offered, but no control over the fees and 
expenses charged for each option.309 Participants therefore rely 
                                            
reasonably be expected to pay in the normal course of its business 
operations. 
Baden Retirement Plan Services, BENEFITS ADVANTAGE, http://www.badenrps.com/ 
document-view/benefits-advantage-fall-2009 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
 305. See John J. Topoleski, Fee Disclosure in Defined Contribution Retirement Plans: 
Background and Legislation, CONG. RES. SERVICE 1 (Jan. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.aging.senate.gov/crs/pension37.pdf (noting that small differences in the fees 
charged to 401(k) plan participants can “yield large differences in account balances at 
retirement”); Advisory Opinion Guidance, supra note 304 (identifying how plan 
performance is impacted by employer choices in various hypothetical scenarios). 
 306. Topoleski, supra note 305, at 1–2. 
 307. Rosenberg, supra note 302, at 13 (“The interrelated problem for plan participants, 
however, and which amplifies the risk posed to participants by high fees, is the corollary 
finding that higher feeds do not correspond to equivalently higher returns under mutual funds, 
which make up much of the investment menu open to 401(k) plan participants.”). 
[T]he market mechanism might be inefficient in the market for advice. Advice 
markets suffer by definition from information asymmetries between providers and 
recipients. In markets with inattentive consumers and shrouded attributes, perverse 
situations with high fees can persist as bona fide economic equilibria when there are 
enough naive consumers and the only profitable business model is to offer a product 
with low base prices and high “surprise” fees . . . . Are professional fiduciaries 
trustworthy or not? There is much anecdotal evidence of problems, for example of 
outrageously high fees, but a systematic quantification is needed. 
Agarwal et al., supra note 58, at 92–93 (citations omitted). 
 308. “[T]he amount of fees contained in mutual funds or other investment options in a 
401(k) plan significantly impacts the long-term outcome for plan participants.” Rosenberg, 
supra note 302, at 13. 
 309. Id. 
A compounding . . . problem for both plan participants and fiduciaries is 
that, under the operation of a 401(k) plan, large numbers of plan 
participants are limited to the investment options provided in a plan 
menu. . . . [P]lan participants have limited, if any, control over the fees they 
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upon fiduciaries to monitor and evaluate the costs associated 
with plan investments. 
Many fee cases also address the related problem of revenue 
sharing where a portion of fees charged on the mutual fund options 
are used to offset administrative costs of the plan.310 Under a 
revenue sharing arrangement in defined contribution plans, high 
plan fees “reduce or effectively eliminate the plan [employer’s] own 
costs in offering a 401(k) plan . . .”311 Because high fees erode 
individual account savings, revenue sharing “creates a potential 
tension between the short-term financial interests of the plan 
sponsor and the long-term financial interests of plan participants,” 
which if proven could create the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty 
of loyalty claim.312 
Additionally, revenue sharing practices were the basis of duty 
of disclosure claims where the plaintiffs argued that employers 
failed to adequately disclose the nature and extent of the 
revenue sharing arrangements.313 DOL final rules, proposed in 
February 2012, require additional participant disclosures 
regarding administrative fees, individual expense information, 
and quarterly statements “showing the dollar amount of the 
plan-related fees and expenses (whether ‘administrative’ or 
‘individual’) actually charged to or deducted from their 
individual accounts, along with a description of the services for 
which the charge or deduction was made.”314 The DOL rules 
clarified obligations for disclosing revenue sharing practices. If 
                                            
pay to invest for retirement. . . . They are . . . at the mercy of 
the . . . decisions made by the plan’s fiduciary. 
Id. 
 310. Id. (“Many so-called ‘excessive fee’ claims also attack the alleged problem of revenue 
sharing, in which a portion of the fees in the mutual fund options themselves are used to fund 
the administration of the plan.”). 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. The Eighth Circuit refused to declare that revenue sharing and disclosures related 
thereto could not be the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Finding those types of claims 
to be “fact and context sensitive” and should not be decided as a matter of law. Braden v. Wal-
Mart Stores, 588 F.3d 585, 600 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 314. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5(c) (2012); Fact Sheet, supra note 187. Beginning in 2009, 
employer sponsors were also required to disclosure revenue sharing practices on form 5550 
filed with the DOL to include 
(1) identifying information for all direct and indirect compensation over $5000, 
(2) the types of services being provided, (3) the relationship of the service provider to 
the plan and any party in interest, (4) whether the indirect fees are eligible or 
ineligible indirect compensation, and (5) whether any service provider failed or 
refused to provide the fee disclosure information necessary to complete Schedule C. 
Kathryn L. Moore, 401(k) Plan Fees: A Trifecta of Governmental Oversight, in NYU 
REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 17-1, 17-5 to 17-6 
(Alvin Lurie ed., 2009) (citations omitted). 
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employer sponsors comply with DOL disclosure rules for 
revenue sharing practices, they will avoid disclosure-based 
liability. 
A trio of recent cases explored fiduciary liability for high fees 
charged by plan trustees and the investment advisors,315 which were 
passed through by employers as well as revenue-sharing practices316 
between the fiduciaries. In the 2009 case of Hecker v. Deere & Co., 
the Seventh Circuit was the first appellate court to rule on the 
excessive fee issue. At issue in the case was whether the employer 
violated its fiduciary duties to participants by offering investment 
options with excessive fees and not disclosing a revenue sharing 
provision between it and the plan administrators.317 The excessive 
fee claim that remained against the employer alleged that the fees 
charged to participants were the same as those paid by retail 
                                            
 315. Ultimately, the court denied employer liability finding that the participants 
were advised of the total fee amounts charged to each account and that participants were 
able to select lower fee alternatives available through an open broker window that offered 
over 2,500 retail mutual funds. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586, 590 (7th Cir. 
2009); see also Jeffrey D. Mamorsky, DOL Fee Disclosure Regulations and Litigation Creates 
Havoc for Plan Sponsor Fiduciaries, J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 1 
(discussing recent litigation about fiduciary duties and high plan fees charged to 
participants). In 2009, the Eighth Circuit reversed a dismissal of excessive fee claims in 
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores. Braden, 588 F.3d at 589. The court concluded that the plaintiff 
alleged sufficient facts to withstand dismissal and remanded the case. Id. at 595. Among 
these facts were that plan funds charged high market fees while underperforming, that all 
fees were paid by plan assets and thus depleted retirees’ accounts, that participants were 
charged retail fees, that fees were not evaluated in plan selection, and that the revenue 
sharing arrangement was not adequately disclosed. Id. at 598–99. A 2012 district court case 
evaluating similar issues determined that if a fiduciary is paid via revenue sharing, “it must 
also have gone through a deliberative process for determining why such a choice is in the 
Plan’s and participants’ best interest.” Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 WL 
1113291, at *16 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), amended in part sub nom. Tussey v. ABB Inc., 
06-4305-CV-C-NKL, 2012 WL 2368471 (W.D. Mo. June 21, 2012), reconsideration denied, 
2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 WL 5512389 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 2012) (pending on appeal before 
the Eighth Circuit). The district court found after a four-week bench trial that the employer 
sponsor failed to reasonably monitor the expenses paid by participants in breach of the 
fiduciary obligation to do so. Id. at *35. The employer sponsor failed to calculate the total 
amount paid for recordkeeping fees, was unaware that it could leverage the plan’s size, was 
informed by an outside consultant that it was paying too much for fees, had not determined 
if it was paying a favorable rate for administrative services, and was unaware of general 
market prices for “comparable recordkeeping fees”. Id. at *10. 
 316. Many fee cases also address the related problem of revenue sharing “in which a 
portion of the fees in the mutual fund options themselves are used to fund the 
administration of the plan.” Rosenberg, supra note 302, at 13; see also Hecker, 556 F.3d at 
586. Under a revenue sharing arrangement in defined contribution plans, high plan fees 
“reduce or effectively eliminate the plan [employer’s] own costs in offering a 401(k) 
plan . . . .” Rosenberg, supra note 302, at 13. Because high fees erode individual account 
savings, revenue sharing therefore “creates a potential tension between the short-term 
financial interests of the plan sponsor and the long-term financial interests of plan 
participants” which if proven could create the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty 
claim. Id. 
 317. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 578. 
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investors who invest individually and outside of a specific plan.318 
For example, if an individual investor purchased mutual fund 
shares through eTrade, the “retail” investor would have been 
charged the same administrative fees and expenses as a 
participant in the employer-sponsored plan. The argument 
here is analogous to buying group health insurance because 
group purchases through an employer-sponsored plan should 
yield lower premiums for participants than an individual going 
to the market to obtain private health insurance.319 The 
plaintiffs argued that paying retail fees was excessive in the 
context of the bulk buying power in an employer-sponsored 
plan.320 
Revenue sharing claims, on the other hand, challenged 
how the fees were paid, not the amount of the fee.321 The 
plaintiffs also alleged that Fidelity Research, the plan advisor, 
shared its revenue earned from mutual fund fees with Fidelity 
Trust, the plan trustee.322 Fidelity Trust applied the fee 
revenues to administrative expenses rather than charging 
Deere directly for its services.323 The basic argument with 
revenue sharing claims is that participants were charged 
higher fees in order to offset administrative service fees that 
would otherwise have been paid by the employer-sponsor.324 
                                            
 318.  
Importantly, all of these funds were also offered to investors in the general 
public, and so the expense ratios necessarily were set against the backdrop of 
market competition. The fact that it is possible that some other funds might 
have had even lower ratios is beside the point; nothing in ERISA requires every 
fiduciary to scour the market to find and offer the cheapest possible fund (which 
might, of course, be plagued by other problems. 
Id. at 586. 
 319. Steve Sternberg, Mistakes to Avoid When Buying Health Insurance, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REPORT (Aug. 7, 2012), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/health-
insurance/articles/2012/08/07/mistakes-to-avoid-when-buying-health-insurance. 
 320. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 579 (“None of the Fidelity Research funds operated 
exclusively for Deere employees; all were available on the open market for the same fee.”). 
 321. Id. at 585. 
 322. Id. at 578. 
 323. Id. 
The Hecker group alleges that Fidelity Research shared its revenue, which it earned 
from the mutual fund fees, with Fidelity Trust. Fidelity Trust in turn compensated 
itself through those shared fees, rather than through a direct charge to Deere for its 
services as trustee. As the Hecker group sees it, this led to a serious—in fact, 
impermissible—lack of transparency in the fee structure, because the mutual fund 
fees were devoted not only to the (proper) cost of managing the funds, but also to the 
(improper) cost of administering Deere’s 401(k) plans. 
Id. 
 324. Id. at 579; see also Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 WL 1113291, 
at *9 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) (explaining that participants pay for revenue sharing expenses 
because such expenses are paid from the investment’s assets). The prospectus for each 
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The Seventh Circuit concluded, however, that high retail 
fees did not breach a fiduciary duty because participants were 
offered alternative investment options through an open 
brokerage window and therefore were not necessarily required 
to pay the high fees.325 Thus, variety in investment options 
cured the high retail fees paid in the traditional, and most 
selected, options.326 Similarly, the court held that revenue 
sharing of administrative fees did not breach a fiduciary duty 
and that there was no duty to disclose the fee-sharing 
relationship.327 As noted above, DOL regulations have since 
expanded employer disclosure obligations with regard to 
revenue sharing practices requiring quarterly statements of 
actual expenses charged to individual accounts.328 
Later in 2009, the Eighth Circuit reversed a dismissal of 
excessive fee claims in Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores.329 The 
complaint raised several specific claims which collectively 
alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by the employer for failing to 
adequately “evaluate the investment options included in the 
Plan” and challenged the process by which funds were selected 
for inclusion in the plan, asserting that high fees and revenue 
sharing practices influenced final decisions.330 The Eighth 
                                            
investment includes an expense ratio which affects the net asset value of investments. 
Investment expenses are paid from the assets of the investment, and therefore investors 
themselves pay the investment’s expenses. Id. When those expenses are shared with other 
plan administrators and cover such expenses as recordkeeping or trustee services, the practice 
is called revenue sharing. Like other aspects of the defined contribution model, here the 
administrative costs of the plan are shifted away from the employer sponsor to the employee 
participant. Id. 
 325. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586. 
 326. The plan investments provided by Deere included “23 different Fidelity mutual 
funds, two investment funds managed by Fidelity Trust, a fund devoted to Deere’s stock, and a 
Fidelity-operated facility called BrokerageLink, which gave participants access to some 2,500 
additional funds managed by different companies.” Id. at 578. 
 327. Id. at 585–87. 
 328. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5(c) (2012). 
The long-awaited and recently finalized fee disclosure regulations are likely 
to add fuel to the excessive fee case trend . . . . The new 
regulations . . . require “transparency of fees” by service providers in order 
to better enable plan fiduciaries to select among them . . . . In view of the 
DOL’s stated rationale of requiring more transparency of fees and the 
industry’s resistance to providing anything more than the currently 
disclosed expense ratio, the arena of required fee disclosure is likely to be a 
hotbed of disputes to come. 
Capobianco & Jara, supra note 49, at *5. 
 329. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 589–90 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 330.  
Braden filed his complaint . . . alleging five causes of action against Wal-
Mart and the individual appellees, executives serving on or responsible for 
overseeing the Retirement Plans Committee. The gravamen of the complaint 
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Circuit concluded that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to 
withstand dismissal and remanded the case.331 Among these 
facts were that plan funds charged high market fees while 
underperforming, that all fees were paid by plan assets and 
thus depleted retirees’ accounts, that participants were 
charged retail fees, that fees were not evaluated in plan 
selection, and that the revenue sharing arrangement was not 
adequately disclosed.332 The parties reached a settlement 
agreement in December 2011, when the defendants agreed to 
pay over $13.5 million in damages and make changes to the 
plan, including increased participant education, decreased 
retail-fee charging investment options, and enhanced fee 
disclosures consistent with proposed DOL regulations.333 
A 2012 district court case evaluating similar issues 
determined that if a fiduciary is paid via revenue sharing, “it 
must also have gone through a deliberative process for 
determining why such a choice is in the Plan’s and participants’ 
best interest.”334 Once again the revenue sharing practices 
between Fidelity Trust and Fidelity Research were at issue.335 
The district court found after a four-week bench trial that the 
employer sponsor failed to reasonably monitor the expenses 
paid by participants in breach of the fiduciary obligation to do 
so.336 The employer sponsor failed to calculate the total amount 
paid for recordkeeping fees, was unaware that it could 
leverage the plan’s size, was informed by an outside consultant 
that it was paying too much for fees, had not determined if it 
was paying a favorable rate for administrative services, and 
was unaware of general market prices for “comparable 
recordkeeping fees.”337 
                                            
is that appellees failed adequately to evaluate the investment options 
included in the Plan. It alleges that the process by which the mutual funds 
were selected was tainted by appellees’ failure to consider trustee Merrill 
Lynch’s interest in including funds that shared their fees with the trustee. 
The result of these failures . . . is that some or all of the investment options 
included in the Plan charge excessive fees. 
Id. 
 331. Id. at 591. 
 332. Id. at 598–99. 
 333. William P. Barrett, Walmart, Merrill Lynch Agree to Pay $13.5 Million to Settle 
401(k) Fiduciary Lawsuit, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
williampbarrett/2011/12/05/walmart-merrill-lynch-agree-to-pay-13-5-million-to-settle-
401k-fiduciary-lawsuit/. 
 334. Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 WL 1113291, at *16 (W.D. 
Mo. Mar. 31, 2012). 
 335. Id. at *1–2. 
 336. Id. at *2, *10. 
 337. Id. at *10. 
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Failure of oversight in light of plan statements that 
revenue sharing would be used to “offset or reduce 
recordkeeping costs” resulted in a breach of fiduciary duty.338 
Employers cannot be blind to costs that do not result in an 
increase in their own expenses.339 The district court cautioned 
employers that “[w]hile revenue sharing is accepted industry-
wide as a method of paying for plan recordkeeping services, 
the prudence of choosing that option must be evaluated 
according to the circumstances of each plan.”340 The employer 
also breached duties when it removed low-fee options and 
replaced them with higher fee options motivated, at least in 
part, by increasing revenue sharing to cover administrative 
expenses.341 Specifically, the court found that the duty of 
prudence was violated “(1) when they failed to follow the IPS 
when it considered only two viable options for a managed 
allocation fund, and (2) failed to engage in a deliberative 
assessment of the merits when determining which investment 
option to choose.”342 
Defined contribution participants’ “choice” in self-directed 
plans regarding investment allocation restricts the scope of the 
traditional ERISA fiduciary protections under the safe 
harbor.343 These cases illustrate the limitations of investor 
choice in defined contribution plans and highlight the 
continued control exercised by employers and other plan 
fiduciaries with significant impact on individual retirement 
savings. Employers and other plan fiduciaries exercise 
structural control over plans, which warrants oversight but is 
difficult to achieve due to the narrow scope of liability for 
fiduciaries of defined contribution plans. These cases highlight 
the limited grounds on which plaintiffs can raise breach of 
fiduciary duty claims in relationship to fees, the lack of a 
                                            
 338. Id. at *10–11. 
 339. “[W]ithout calculating the dollar amount of the recordkeeping fees, ABB could 
not know whether revenue sharing was offsetting or reducing the cost. . . . ABB’s 
monitoring of the reasonableness of the overall expense ratio was insufficient because it 
does not show how much revenue is flowing, does not show the competitive market for 
comparable funds, and fails to take into account the size of the plan.” Mamorsky, supra 
note 315, at 1–2. 
 340. Tussey, 2012 WL 1113291 at *15. 
 341. Id. at *21 (“[T]he Vanguard Wellington Fund with its low fees, and long-
standing consistent performance history, made it a very attractive fund . . . . The Court 
believes that the Wellington Fund’s removal was not due to any failure of its merits, but 
because the Freedom Funds that replaced it generated more in revenue sharing for 
Fidelity Trust.”). 
 342. Id. at *22. 
 343. Maher & Stris, supra note 88, at 459 n.129. 
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cohesive approach to fees in federal courts, and the impact 
structural decisions have on participant options, and in many 
cases, their retirement savings outcomes. 
VI. SUGGESTED REFORMS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Citizen shareholders bear traditional investment risks that all 
shareholders face—rising or falling stock market—but citizen 
shareholders shoulder those risks in the context of limited 
accountability mechanisms. The shift from defined benefit to 
defined contribution plans, the emergence of self-directed 
retirement accounts, and the resulting dependence on the stock 
market, particularly mutual and index funds, created our defined 
contribution society where employees bear significant retirement 
risks. ERISA’s regulatory framework is not focused on and does not 
mitigate these new risks. To help balance these risks borne by 
citizen shareholders, ERISA regulations should focus on both 
structural and individual reforms. 
A. Structural Reforms 
Structural reforms focus on how citizen shareholders invest 
in the market and the regulatory environment protecting them.344 
The following is a brief discussion of possible structural reforms 
including strengthening fiduciary duties for structural plan 
decisions, especially those related to fees and expenses, 
evaluating the fractured oversight and implementation of 
ERISA, and examining the role of intermediaries in self-directed 
defined contribution plans. The suggestions provided below are a 
starting point for thinking about reforms, a complete discussion 
of which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Re-evaluating the substantive barriers to fiduciary duty 
oversight is a key area of structural reform. The fee litigation 
cases illustrate the control that plan fiduciaries continue to 
exercise over self-directed defined contribution plans.345 Since 
participant choice is the basis for applying the safe harbor 
exemption, structural decisions that restrict and impact 
participants’ choice should be subject to the full scope of fiduciary 
duties as originally conceived of in ERISA, not the safe harbor 
applied to self-directed accounts. This is particularly relevant in 
                                            
 344. For instance, rules promulgated by the IRS regarding automatic enrollment 
impact how citizens shareholders invest because they are more likely to invest. And rules 
released by the DOL regarding disclosures focus on the regulation of retirement plans. 
See infra note 365 (explaining the IRS automatic enrollment rules and DOL disclosure 
rules). 
 345. See supra Part V.C.2 (discussing fee litigation cases). 
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light of information asymmetries and financial illiteracy that call 
into question participants’ ability to effectively evaluate the impact 
that fees have on long-term savings goals.346 High fees, especially 
when they serve as a means to offset administrative costs of plan 
sponsors (employers), exacerbate these information asymmetries 
and the risks borne by participants. Additionally, reliance on open-
market investment alternatives like those offered in open brokerage 
window options fail to cure the structural defect or consequence of 
high fees. The endorsement bias for the twenty or so funds offered 
within a self-directed defined contribution plan make those options, 
despite the high fees, attractive to many participants.347 Additional 
behavior biases such as inertia, immobilization and 
procrastination348 make the brokerage window a theoretically 
unattractive option for many participants who feel ill-equipped to 
make investment decisions.349 Brokerage window accounts should 
not be allowed to create the illusion of choice and therefore allow 
the safe harbor affirmative defense to apply to other structural 
decisions. 
Another area of structural ERISA reforms for citizen 
shareholders involves the fractured oversight of self-directed 
defined contribution plans. Three major agencies—the DOL, the 
SEC, and the IRS—are tasked with various functions under 
ERISA.350 Congress designated the DOL, acting through the 
                                            
 346. See Barr & Diamond, supra note 207, at 8–9. 
In the context of pensions, there is ample evidence of poor 
information . . . [V]irtually nobody realizes the significance of administrative 
charges for pensions . . . [O]ver a full career, an annual management charge of 
1 percent of the individual’s accumulation reduces the accumulation (and 
hence the pension) by 20 percent. 
Id. 
 347. See Medill, supra note 33, at 335–36 (explaining how investors will reduce 
information costs by selecting “heavily marketed, broker-sold investment funds, even 
though those funds have higher fees”). 
 348. “Recent lessons from behavioral economics also yield powerful lessons, 
explaining such phenomena as procrastination (people delay saving, do not save, or do 
not save enough), inertia (people stay where they are), and immobilization (whereby 
conflicts and confusion lead people to behave passively, like a deer in the headlights).” 
Barr & Diamond, supra note 207, at 9. 
 349. Note that there is no current data for the number of self-directed defined 
contribution participants who opt for open-brokerage window investment allocations 
nor for the amount of money invested in these vehicles relative to all defined 
contribution dollars. 
 350. ERISA regulations govern all benefit plans and the oversight agencies that 
implement and enforce ERISA standards. The DOL acts primarily through the Employee 
Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) and the U.S. Department of Treasury through 
the IRS. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 31. The PBGC, a third regulatory agency over ERISA, 
oversees Title IV of ERISA dealing with insurance and guarantees defined benefit plans. 
“PBGC was created . . . to encourage the continuation and maintenance of private-sector 
defined benefit pension plans, provide timely and uninterrupted payment of pension 
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Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), as the primary 
regulatory agency for enforcing ERISA standards related to plan 
reporting and disclosures, fiduciary duties, plan administration, 
and private enforcement actions.351 The DOL is also responsible for 
financial education of employees, a task that is not mandated under 
ERISA regulations but serves an important role in the retirement 
framework, especially for self-directed defined contribution plans.352 
In addition to the IRS, which administers Title II of ERISA,353 the 
SEC regulates the sale and reporting requirements for the 
investments offered in self-directed defined contribution plans.354 
Regulatory authority, interpretations and enforcement are spread 
across several agencies complicating the process for citizen 
shareholders as well as employers to navigate.355 Additionally, the 
fractured regulatory landscape reduces the priority that any one  
agency can make ERISA policy development, oversight, or 
enforcement.356 
The issues addressed in each agency’s silo—workplace, 
tax, or securities—have implications in the other arenas as 
well. For example, the SEC proposed advertising rule 
amendments related to target-date funds, popular mutual fund 
products, requiring companies to include the date in the fund 
                                            
benefits, and keep pension insurance premiums at a minimum.” Who We Are, PBGC, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/about/who-we-are.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
 351. Medill, supra note 33, at 327. Thus, the EBSA carries out the DOL’s 
responsibilities under ERISA Title I. History of EBSA and ERISA, DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). At the time 
of its name change in February 2003, “EBSA was known as the Pension and Welfare 
Benefits Administration (PWBA). Prior to January 1986, PWBA was known as the 
Pension and Welfare Benefits Program.” Id. 
 352. See Medill, supra note 33, at 341–42 (discussing the DOL’s role as the primary 
agency responsible for financial education of employees and criticisms regarding the 
limitations of DOL’s efficacy in that role). Additionally, there are “four federal regulatory 
agencies involved in educating the public to save and invest for retirement. In addition to 
the DOL, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of the 
Treasury also have public education initiatives, as does the Social Security 
Administration.” Id. at 348 (footnotes omitted). 
 353. The IRS administers Title II of ERISA, regarding funding, vesting, and 
minimum payments as well as overseeing the tax-exempt and tax-deferred components of 
pension benefits. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 31, 34. In 1978 President Jimmy Carter issued 
an Executive Statement reorganizing jurisdiction under ERISA as between the DOL and 
the DOT. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (1978), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. app. at 297–99 (Supp. II 1976), and in 92 Stat. 3793 (1978); see also KOZAK, supra 
note 4, at 33–35. 
 354. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo. 
shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
 355. See KOZAK, supra note 4, at 32–35 (discussing the various federal agencies with 
the authority to issue regulations and interpretations under ERISA). 
 356. See id. (discussing how the Department of Treasury and DOL may issue regulations 
that carry the force of law; however, that does not give priority to one agency over the other). 
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name and provide a description of the asset allocation within 
the fund.357 The SEC focused on target-date funds because of 
the decline of defined benefit pensions and the growth of the 
defined contribution society where “Americans are increasingly 
responsible for constructing and managing their own 
retirement portfolios,” a task that can be “challenging” and 
require “significant knowledge and commitment of time.”358 These 
additional disclosures, while beneficial, do not address the broader 
issue of how to provide employees with comparative disclosures of 
their investment options within a given plan in a way that will help 
them choose the appropriate investment vehicle and actively 
manage their accounts.359 There is little coordination among the 
SEC’s advertising rules and the DOL’s investor education programs 
or reporting requirements.360 Fractured oversight, implementation, 
and enforcement limit the effectiveness of any single agency’s 
efforts within its individual silo.361 The workplace, tax, and 
securities policies related to citizen shareholders should be 
considered in a dedicated, consolidated agency vested with policy 
development, implementation, education, oversight, and 
enforcement of self-directed defined contribution plans. 
Another area of potential structural reform may be found in 
closely examining the role of institutional investors (i.e., mutual and 
index funds) as well as other intermediaries such as investment 
brokers and advisors who facilitate citizen shareholders’ 
investments, who benefit directly from fee arrangements and who 
represent the interests of citizen shareholders in the private 
securities market. A subsequent article focusing more extensively 
on the role of corporate governance and securities statutes will 
scrutinize the role of intermediaries in our defined contribution 
society. 362 
                                            
 357. Investment Company Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund Names and 
Marketing, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,920 (proposed June 23, 2010) [hereinafter Investment Company 
Advertising] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 270), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/33-9126.pdf; see also Investment Company 
Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund Names and Marketing, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,920 
(proposed Apr. 6, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 270), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2012/33-9309.pdf (reopening the comment period in 2012 in 
response to an SEC-sponsored survey on TDF disclosures). 
 358. Investment Company Advertising, supra note 357, at 35,920. 
 359. See infra text accompanying note 387 (suggesting disclosures should be simplified 
and consolidated because too much information can create “noise” ignored by investors). 
 360. For instance, the DOL released guidelines on its reporting requirements; however, 
these guidelines do not incorporate the reporting requirements of the IRS. Reporting and 
Disclosure Guide for Employee Benefit Plans, DOL 1 (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/rdguide.pdf. 
 361. Id. 
 362. See supra note 34. 
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Some risks borne by participants under our defined 
contribution society cannot be fully mitigated. Market 
performance, for example, is a risk some party in the framework 
has to bear.363 Public guarantee options may not be the silver-
bullet solution when the PBGC is notoriously underfunded.364 The 
discussion of shifting risks of self-directed systems that in turn 
link individual financial security with the performance of private 
securities markets may have application to broader policy 
debates such as social security reform and questions of 
privatization. 
B. Individual Reforms 
Reforms focused on the individual participant are needed to 
mitigate some of the risks shifted onto citizen shareholders in our 
defined contribution society and better prepare participants to 
assume the retirement savings responsibility required for 
individual and national financial security. Reforms focused on 
individuals should tackle several existing deficiencies within the 
ERISA framework such as contribution defaults, investor 
disclosures, and financial literacy. 
To claim that ERISA has been wholly unresponsive to the 
retirement revolution and the prevalence of the self-directed 
defined contribution plans would be an overstatement. ERISA 
has incorporated limited reforms that are intended to ease the 
burden of individual management of retirement accounts. These 
reforms include automatic enrollment default rules in 401(k) 
plans and efforts at reforming participant disclosures.365 The 
market has also been somewhat responsive. The evolution of 
target date retirement funds was in direct response to the 
problem of self-directed defined contribution plans where 
participants had no desire and/or confidence in his or her ability 
to actively manage retirement savings.366 Target date funds are a 
                                            
 363. See THE PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 358 (Newman et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 1992) (describing risk as having a “pervasive role in economic life”); see also 
supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text (discussing how market performance risk 
shifted from employers to employees). 
 364. See PBGC, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 24 (2012), 
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2012-annual-report.pdf (stating that the PBGC’s overall 
financial position has declined and the deficit increased to $34.38 billion as of September 
30, 2012). 
 365. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 63 (“In 1998 and 2000 the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) issued regulations that allow employers to enroll employees 
automatically . . . .”); see also Fact Sheet, supra note 187 (providing an overview of new 
DOL rules relating to disclosures of plan-related information). 
 366. Investment Company Advertising, supra note 357, at 35,921 (“Target date 
retirement funds . . . are designed to make it easier for investors to hold a diversified portfolio 
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“hybrid” fund that allocates investments based upon a risk 
formula that is calculated according to an estimated retirement 
date (i.e., the target date) of the participant.367 These initial 
responses improved the risk balance in participants’ favor, but do 
not set the correct balance of risk mitigation and management. 
These developments are built upon in the following suggestions 
discussed below. 
1. Sticky Defaults and Nudges. Self-directed defined 
contribution plans may offer a default option of automatic 
enrollment, meaning that an employee is automatically enrolled 
to participate in the 401(k) with an opt-out option, rather than 
requiring the employee to opt into the plan to participate.368 
Automatic enrollment eliminates some of the procrastination 
and inertia problems that individuals may have with starting 
retirement savings.369 Automatic enrollment does not eliminate 
those problems with regard to account management.370 The 
default contribution rates and allocations under automatic 
enrollment are not ideal for participants and do not 
sufficiently mitigate the risks shifted onto them in self-
directed defined contribution plans. Reliance on default 
contribution rates and allocations highlight the concept of 
“sticky defaults,” where employees do the least to actively 
manage their retirement accounts and “stick” in the default 
options.371 For example, participants through automatic 
                                            
of assets that is rebalanced automatically among asset classes over time without the need for 
each investor to rebalance his or her own portfolio repeatedly.”). 
 367. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 120. Target date funds are also known as lifestyle 
funds. Id. at 235, 240. 
 368. For a discussion of automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans, see Medill, supra note 33, 
at 333. 
 369. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 65 (“[A]utomatic enrollment has a dramatic 
effect on employee participation rates, with the largest increases among groups that benefit the 
most: low-income workers.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1393 (noting that after 
automatic enrollment, 401(k) participation increased even though opting out of it was easy). 
 370. See Medill, supra note 33, at 333 (explaining that automatic enrollment plans 
increase employee participation, but employees usually do not increase their contribution 
levels, even when wages are increased). 
 371.  
[T]he problem of sticky defaults explains why participation rates in 401(k) plans can 
be improved dramatically by changing the ‘default’ option from nonparticipation to 
participation in the plan through an automatic enrollment feature. It also explains 
why workers who are automatically enrolled in 401(k) plans tend to ‘stick’ at the 
contribution levels assigned by their employers rather than increasing their 
contribution levels over time as their wages increase, and tend to remain in the 
default investment option assigned by their employers, such as ‘safe’ but low-earning 
money market funds. 
Id. 
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enrollment have lower than average savings “because workers 
tend to stay with the low default contribution rates.”372 
Participants are also likely to stay in the original asset class 
assignment provided with automatic enrollment, which may be a 
money market or other low-yield allocation.373 
In light of the success of automatic enrollment promoting 
participation and the trap of sticky defaults, such as low 
contribution rates and low-yield investment allocations, 
participants could be provided with other risk-mitigating nudges 
in the form of defaults and prompts. For example, contribution 
default reforms, with opt-out options, could increase the 
minimum savings for most participants by automatically 
increasing contribution levels with salary increases or at a 
gradual annual rate until a minimum recommended savings level 
(i.e., 6% or more) is achieved. 
Additionally, requiring annual investment reallocations 
could address the problem of assets permanently remaining in 
default, low-yield allocations. For example, participants could be 
required to reallocate within one year or be placed in a target-
date fund.374 Additionally participants could be asked to provide a 
preferred allocation between asset classes such as money-market 
funds, bonds, mutual funds, etc. An employee could opt for 70% 
in mutual funds, 20% in bonds, and 10% in money-market funds. 
The account would be automatically reallocated annually to 
maintain the default asset class diversification specified at 
                                            
 372. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 65. “Several papers have recognized that 
default contribution rates that are too low may prevent workers from accumulating enough 
retirement wealth, taking advantage of employer-matching contributions, and exploiting the 
tax advantages of investing in pension assets.” Lusardi, supra note 183, at 134. 
 373. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 91. Money market funds invest in “short-term, 
high-grade fixed-income securities, and seek[] the highest level of income consistent with 
preservation of capital (i.e., maintaining a stable share price).” INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 
236. Money market funds have low yields, averaging as low as 0.03% because of low short-term 
interest rates. Walter Updegrave, Are Money-Market Accounts and Funds the Same?, CNN 
MONEY, (June 13, 2012, 5:17 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/ 06/13/pf/expert/money-market-
funds.moneymag/index.htm. 
Money-market funds are designed to maintain a stable price of $1 per share with 
each dollar of interest you collect earning you an additional share of the fund. 
 
But there’s no guarantee that a money-fund’s share value won’t sink below $1. And, 
in fact, after decades of a nearly flawless record of money funds preserving a $1 per 
share value, in September 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund ‘broke the buck,’ or let its 
share price slip below $1, after suffering losses on Lehman Brothers debt it owned. 
Id. 
 374. Target date funds can be the default option in automatic enrollment self-directed 
defined contribution plans. Craig Copland, Target-Date Fund Use in 401(k) Plans and the 
Persistence of Their Use, 2007-2009, EBRI.ORG, at 10 (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_08-2011_No361_TDFs.pdf. 
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enrollment. This would address the problem of employees staying 
in initial asset allocations.375 Additionally this cures situations 
where an employee makes an initial investment allocation among 
plan investment options but then does not readjust the 
allocation balance as certain asset classes earn higher returns 
so that over a period of time a 70-20-10 allocation, as described 
above, could become a 80-18-2 allocation. 
Another individual reform sticky default is an opt-out option 
for defined contribution benefits to be converted in whole or in part 
to an annuity at the time of retirement, rather than a lump sum 
payment. There may be cost advantages available to participants 
who purchase annuities at the time of retirement, rather than later 
in life, and through a plan, rather than individually. Annuities 
would mitigate some of the longevity risks borne by employees as 
well as the risks of market performance in retirement years when 
investments should be conservative to preserve accumulated 
savings.376 
2. Disclosures. Individual reforms must also focus on the 
related issues of disclosures and financial literacy. To reform 
disclosures without providing participants with the tools to digest 
and utilize the information contained in the disclosures is a wasted 
effort that may be politically expedient but does little to mitigate 
the risks shifted onto citizen shareholders.377 The issue of 
disclosures and financial education are hefty and complicated topics 
that warrant their own paper. The following brief discussion of 
disclosure and education issues raises some initial areas of reform 
and issues to be further considered in a more thorough treatment of 
these topics. 
ERISA recently augmented participant disclosure 
requirements.378 New regulations require fiduciaries to provide 
participants with (1) general plan information about investment 
options whether or not a brokerage-window is available,379 
                                            
 375. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 93 (suggesting employers offer funds that 
adjust periodically according to the participant’s age and risk tolerance level because it is 
“particularly important in view of plan participants’ failure to diversify and their inertia with 
regard to changing investments over time”). 
 376. See Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 526. Consider alternatively criticism that “[m]andatory 
annuitization may deter some, perhaps many, employees from participating in defined 
contribution plans or individual retirement accounts by imposing a restriction they consider 
onerous.” Id. 
 377. See Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1850 (noting that even though mandating 
disclosures is politically easy, recent research suggests disclosures are not enough to influence 
investor behavior). 
 378. See Fact Sheet, supra note 187, at 1–4. 
 379. Ron Lieber, Seeking Investment Flexibility In a 401(k), N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2011), 
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(2) disclosures of fees and expenses charged or deducted from 
participant accounts, and (3) load fees and other expenses 
associated with account actions.380 In addition, participants will 
receive quarterly statements “showing the dollar amount of the 
plan-related fees and expenses (whether ‘administrative’ or 
‘individual’) actually charged to or deducted from their individual 
accounts, along with a description of the services for which the 
charge or deduction was made.”381 
Disclosures must also include for each investment option 
(1) performance data of the prior one-, five-, and ten-year 
returns,382 and (2) benchmark data for non-fixed return rate 
options including historical returns of the market over one-, five-, 
and ten-year periods.383 Participants also receive information 
regarding the total annual operating expenses, “expressed as 
both a percentage of assets and as a dollar amount for each 
$1,000 invested” and restrictions on additional purchase or 
withdraw decisions.384 In addition, all participant disclosures 
must include a website address with a glossary of investment-
related terms to facilitate participant comprehension of disclosed 
information and additional investment information.385 The fee 
transparency rules promulgated by the DOL correspond to the 
SEC Investment Company advertising rules which require sales 
materials to contain information not always found in the 
prospectus, such as disclosures regarding “investment objectives, 
risks, and fees, and to present explanatory information” 
prominently as well as include the most recent month-end 
performance data.386 
                                            
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/09/your-money/401ks-and-similar-plans/a-401k-window-to-
more-investing-choices-your-money.html?pagewanted=all (“Your employer can simply add 
something called a self-directed option, also known as a brokerage or mutual fund window. At 
that point, your 401(k) or similar account becomes like a regular brokerage account, where you 
can buy any mutual or exchange-traded fund (and in some cases, any individual stock) you 
want.”). 
 380. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2012); Fact Sheet, supra note 187, at 2. 
 381. Fact Sheet, supra note 187, at 2. 
 382. Investment options with fixed rates of return include bonds, CDs, and certain 
annuities. 
 383. Fact Sheet, supra note 187, at 2. 
 384. Id. at 2–3. 
 385. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (requiring fiduciaries to disclose a general 
glossary of terms to help participants understand investment alternatives or provide 
participants with a web address directing them to a glossary of terms). 
 386. Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,712 
(May 24, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, & 274), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8294.htm; SEC Amends Investment Company 
Advertising Rules, FINRA (Jan. 8, 2004), http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/ 
Guidance/MemberAlerts/2004/p002756. 
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Increasing the information that employer sponsors must 
provide is the first step in disclosure and education reform. A 
second step should focus on simplifying, consolidating, and 
translating information into digestible and useable formats 
informed by behavioral economics to promote both 
comprehension and action. For example, inundation with 
mandatory information translates into noise that participants 
are likely to ignore.387 Isolated information regarding individual 
investment options should be replaced with consolidated 
disclosures that provide a comparison among all options in a 
plan, as well as market averages for the asset class. For example, 
information regarding a TIAA-CREF Growth and Retail Fund 
would be compared with other growth-oriented mutual funds 
offered in the company’s plan, as well as the market average for 
growth funds. This comparison data should include more than 
past returns, which are a poor indicator of future performance,388 
and should focus on fees and fee sharing arrangements. These 
comparisons would place the disclosed information into a context 
that would be useful for decision-making and disaggregate 
information relevant to investment allocation, especially in the 
contained universe of investing within a self-directed defined 
contribution plan.389 The DOL and the SEC should also 
coordinate on the issue of required disclosures for assets 
commonly included in plans so that employers receive the 
necessary information from funds, which can then be reported to 
the DOL and disclosed to employee participants. 
3. Financial Education. An issue closely related to 
disclosures is financial education. There is neither mandatory 
employer-provided investment education for participants in self-
directed plans,390 nor is there a financial literacy curriculum 
available in schools, despite the growing number of Americans who 
depend, or are likely to depend, on self-directed defined contribution 
                                            
 387. See Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1854. 
 388. Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 147, at 433–34 (“Extensive studies have 
found only ‘weak and controversial evidence that past performance has much, if any, 
predictive ability for future returns.’ In other words, little evidence of returns persistence 
exists; top performing funds generally do not continue to significantly outperform other 
funds.” (footnotes omitted)); Travis Sapp & Ashish Tiwari, Does Stock Return Momentum 
Explain the “Smart Money” Effect?, 59 J. FIN. 2605, 2607 (2004) (finding that fund flows 
into U.S. equity mutual funds “effectively demonstrate[] that fund investors appear to be 
chasing recent large returns”). 
 389. See Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1852–53 (suggesting that salience of 
information is more important than the disclosure itself because “[i]nvestors, including 
professionals, have only limited attention to devote to processing information.”). 
 390. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 n.1 (2006). 
Do Not Delete  9/22/2013 2:49 PM 
2013] RETIREMENT REVOLUTION 225 
plans for retirement savings. Of the voluntary programs that 
are offered, observers are critical of current investor education 
programs offered by the DOL,391 the agency charged with 
education under ERISA.392 A primary criticism of the DOL is 
that it serves two masters under the ERISA framework: 
employer sponsors and employee participants.393 ERISA’s 
objective of protecting the rights and benefits of plan 
participants also includes avoiding undue administrative 
burdens on employers and preserving employers’ right to 
customize plans.394 The DOL was placed in a difficult situation 
where increased employee education would benefit employees 
but burden employer sponsors. Critics have suggested that the 
DOL struck a balance in favor of employer cost reduction and 
flexibility at the expense of education and employee 
protection.395 The current situation is untenable because our 
defined contribution society is premised on the ability of 
individuals to manage retirement accounts during their 
working life and throughout retirement. That premise requires 
support for education in the form of a national curriculum or 
mandatory employer education. 
Of course, investor education is not a cost-free proposition, 
and resources dedicated to education reform must be allocated  
to effective measures based upon current behavioral economic 
research.396 For example, there are 
specific segments of the U.S. population—those with low 
educational attainment and low income—that save in 
very different ways than more educated and affluent 
households. It may be important to target these groups 
                                            
 391. See Medill, supra note 33, at 341–45. 
 392. Congress named the DOL as the lead agency under the SAVER Act. Savings 
Are Vital to Everyone’s Retirement (SAVER) Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-92, §§ 3, 111 
Stat. 2139, 2139–40 (1997); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146–1447 (2006). 
 393. See Medill, supra note 33, at 344–45 (describing the DOL’s competing goals of 
protecting the rights and benefits of plan participants and preserving the rights of 
employers). 
 394. Id. at 345. 
 395. Id. at 346 (suggesting the DOL’s regulatory provisions were a “compromise 
necessary to encourage employers to sponsor participant-directed 401(k) plans,” but 
cannot “be reconciled with the need to provide workers with a vigorous and effective 
public educator”). 
 396. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 526 (“Before mandating such education, we need 
rigorous proof that the results are likely to justify the costs. Without such data, a 
mandate for employer-provided investor education looks suspiciously like a windfall for 
the providers of that mandated education.”); see also supra note 195 and accompanying 
text (discussing how a policy based on the providing of information to participants that is 
never given, and on the assumption that participants will use information on their own in 
ways that they cannot, is a flawed concept). 
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and devise programs that are better tailored to their 
needs and barriers to saving.397 
Additionally, some research suggests that “employer-
provided educational materials are geared toward individuals 
who are natural ‘planners’ and that these materials do not appeal 
to the approximately 50% of the working population that is not 
planning-oriented.”398 
Whatever education program is developed, it must take into 
account the breadth of participants who are given this 
responsibility with varying cultural and education backgrounds. 
For example at any university, faculty members, administrative 
staff in departments like financial aid and admissions, support 
staff for faculty and administrators, facilities staff like 
housekeeping, and executives of the university all invest in the 
same plan. Any education program must take into account these 
differences in audience in structuring a meaningful education 
tool. 
C. Conclusions 
How people invest in the stock market has changed as a 
result of the retirement revolution from traditional pensions 
(defined benefit plans) to self-directed defined contribution plans 
like the 401(k). The prevalence of self-directed defined 
contribution plans has created a new class of investors—the 
citizen shareholders—who enter the securities market through 
retirement plans, invest for long-term savings goals, and are 
predominantly indirect shareholders. The policy shift pushed 
investors into the markets to save for the individually crucial and 
socially important goal of retirement financial security. Citizen 
shareholders are the fastest growing group of investors, but they 
have limited protections under corporate law, securities 
regulations, and ERISA. 
Citizen shareholders do not fit within the traditional 
corporate law framework of shareholder rights because their 
indirect ownership status dilutes their information and voting 
rights, as well as exacerbates their rational apathy as diffuse and 
disempowered “owners.” The problems of indirect ownership are 
intensified in the context of employer-provided plans where 
investors’ choice to enter the market is constrained as is their 
ability to exit and secure adequate representation by mutual 
fund managers. Secondly, citizen shareholders are largely 
                                            
 397. Lusardi, supra note 183, at 141. 
 398. Medill, supra note 33, at 338–39. 
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excluded from the original protections and safeguards offered 
under ERISA. Citizen shareholders bear the risk of market 
performance, account funding, longevity, and information risks—
risks not borne by retirees under defined benefit plans. Third, 
because citizen shareholders exercise control over their 
investments by allocating savings into various pre-selected 
investment options, employer sponsors and other plan fiduciaries 
can claim a safe harbor affirmative defense against most liability. 
The safe harbor protects fiduciary breaches from liability and in 
many cases shields important structural plan decisions such as 
investment fees and options that significantly impact citizen 
shareholders’ control over their accounts. 
In this Article, I call attention to the retirement revolution 
and the resulting defined contribution society. If participants 
bear the ultimate risk, then they should be both fully informed as 
to the risks and equipped to manage them. I suggest reforms that 
mitigate and balance risks assumed by employee participants 
under our defined contribution society with structural reforms 
like augmented fiduciary duties for structural plan decisions and 
individual reforms focused on utilizing defaults, comparison-
based disclosures and increased financial literacy programs. 
 
